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THE EFFECTS OF WORKER RIGHTS
PROTECTIONS IN UNITED STATES TRADE LAWS:
A CASE STUDY OF EL SALVADOR
Benjamin N. Davis'
INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, Congress enacted several laws requiring respect for
worker rights as a condition of access to United States markets.! This
legislation responded to concerns regarding unfair competition from
countries that use political coercion to keep wages low by preventing
workers from forming effective trade unions.2
Recently, the United States entered into two international agreements
that set back the cause of worker rights. Neither the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),3 nor the agreement produced by the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI),4 contains substantive worker rights protections.' These agree-
* J.D. 1995, Washington College of Law, The American University. The author
thanks the following for their assistance in the preparation of this Comment: Mark
Anner, Alex Baehr, Jose Antonio Candray, Lance Compa. Joseph Damond, Leslie
Deak, Pharis Harvey, Donna Libretti, Sheila O'Leary, and Kurt Stand. This Comment
is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Omar Saul M6nico (1957-1993): per aspera ad
astra.
1. See infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text (describing worker rights provi-
sions in United States trade laws); see also Jorge F. Perez-Lopez Conditioning Trade
on Foreign Labor Lav: The U.S. Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253, 254-59 (1988)
[hereinafter Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade] (providing historical background on
efforts to incorporate fair labor standards into United States trade laws).
2. See infra note 23 (describing Congressional preoccupation with economic
competition from countries that violate worker rights).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
LL.M. 289, 605 (1993); see North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing NAFrA in United
States law).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1125; see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L No. 103-465,
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ments threaten to weaken the unilateral worker rights conditionality of
existing trade laws. At the same time, worker rights advocates have
introduced legislation in Congress to strengthen existing conditionality.6
This Comment analyzes the effectiveness of unilateral worker rights
conditionality by focusing on one country, El Salvador, and one pro-
gram, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).7 An examination of
the impact of worker rights conditionality on Salvadoran law and prac-
tice can illuminate the legal, political, and economic debates over inter-
national worker rights.
Part I of this Comment describes the development of a legal frame-
work that makes the benefits of United States trade laws conditional
upon respect for worker rights. Part I also summarizes the economic,
political, and legal debates over worker rights conditionality. Part II
discusses the effects of El Salvador's history and labor laws on the
current worker rights situation. Part HII recounts the efforts of worker
rights advocates in the United States and El Salvador to use the GSP
108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements in United States
law).
5. See Terry Collingsworth et al., Time for a Global New Deal, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9 [hereinafter Collingsworth et al., New Deal] (observing
that multinational corporations have prevented the inclusion of labor standards in
NAFTA, GATT, and the European Community Charter); Statement of the Labor Advi-
sory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy on the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Jan. 15, 1994 (draft statement) [hereinafter Labor
Advisory Comm.] (analyzing the Uruguay Round Agreements); IAN ROBINSON, NORTH
AMERICAN TRADE AS IF DEMOCRACY MATTERED: WHAT'S WRONG wrrH NAFTA &
WHAT ARE ITS ALTERNATIVE? 37-46 (1993) (scrutinizing the NAFTA side agreement
on labor rights); Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Envi-
ronmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back
and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993) (discussing the impact
of NAFTA on workers in the United States and Mexico); see also 139 CONG. REC.
H8770 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gephardt) (arguing that NAFTA
undermines worker rights protections in the Generalized System of Preferences). Presi-
dent Clinton recently stated his support for extending the provisions of NAFTA to the
Caribbean Basin countries. Richard Lawrence, Clinton Hints Support of Caribbean
Trade Deal, J. COMM., Dee. 1, 1993, at 4A.
6. See GSP Renewal and Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 3625, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) [hereinafter GSP Reform Bill] (proposing amendments to strengthen
worker rights provisions of the Generalized System of Preferences).
7. See JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 278-79 (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (noting that the GSP is an exception to the
most-favored nation principle of GAT which authorizes industrialized countries to es-
tablish reduced tariff rates for imports from developing countries). The United States
has implemented the GSP at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988).
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worker rights provisions to afford greater protection to Salvadoran work-
ers. Part IV analyzes the impact of these efforts. Finally, Part V recom-
mends improving the worker rights provisions of the GSP statute by
toughening the substantive criteria for countries seeking access to the
GSP program and clearing away procedural obstacles that currently
impede removal of worker rights violators from the program.
I. WORKER RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES TRADE LAWS
A. LEGAL PROVISIONS
Statutory provisions conditioning United States trade and foreign assis-
tance on respect for internationally-recognized worker rights" are found
in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 (CBERA),9 the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 19840 the Over-
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAu OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, WORKxR
RIGHTS IN U.S. Poucy 20-31 (1991) (describing the principles of worker rights rec-
ognized in United States trade law as including freedom of association, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, protection against forced labor, a minimum age of
employment, and acceptable conditions of work). United States trade laws do not in-
clude non-discrimination on the basis of gender, race, or other criteria as a worker
right. See Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Insirtments of Recourse
for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 164 (1992) [hereinafter Compa, Inter-
national Labor Standards] (noting that current United States worker rights laws do not
include anti-discrimination provisions); GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, § 3 (1993)
(proposing addition of non-discrimination as a worker right). Analysts often divide
worker rights into two categories: fundamental worker rights (freedom of association,
collective bargaining, forced labor, and discrimination), which are inviolable, and fair
labor standards (child labor, acceptable conditions), which depend to some degree on
a country's cultural practices and level of economic development. See COUNTRY RE-
PORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, S. Prt. 102-5, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.
1693-94 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 STATE DEP'T REPORT] (stating that no flexibility is
permitted with respect to basic labor rights standards, i.e. freedom of association, the
right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibition of forced labor, and non-dis-
crimination); Steve Chamovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International Trade, 20 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 61, 69 (1986) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards] (argu-
ing that fair labor standards should be determined by principles of voluntary choice in
the labor market and universal minimum standards for working conditions).
9. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1989));
see generally Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade, supra note 1, at 259-66 (describing
CBERA worker rights criteria); Steve Chamovitz, Caribbean Basin Initiative: Setting
Labor Standards, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1984, at 54-56 (describing CBERA
worker rights criteria).
10. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-573, § 501, 98 Stat. 2948,
3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988)); see Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
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seas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) Amendments Act," the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,12 the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency Act (MIGA)," the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act (OTCA) of 1988,"4 the Andean Trade Preference Act
of 1991,15 and foreign aid appropriations laws enacted in 1993,16
1994,"7 and 1995."8 In addition, the Trade Act of 1974 establishes
supra note 4, § 601, 108 Stat. at 4990 (extending the deadline for renewal of the
United States GSP program from September 30, 1994 to July 31, 1995).
11. Pub. L. No. 99-204, § 5, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2191 (1988)).
12. Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 207-08, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 5034-35 (1988)); see Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade, supra note 1, at 285-86
(explaining that, under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, United States
companies operating in South Africa are required to adhere to a code that includes
respect for worker rights).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 290k-2 (1989). MIGA is a financing authority initiated by the
World Bank. See Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 101(e), 101 Stat. 1329-131, 1329-134
(1987) (authorizing United States participation in MIGA and instructing the United
States Executive Director of MIGA to seek adoption of a policy of refusing support
to countries that violate internationally recognized worker rights); Jorge F. Perez-
Lopez, Worker Rights in the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, LAB. L.J.,
Apr. 1990, at 222, 226-28 [hereinafter Perez-Lopez, Worker Rights] (explaining United
States advocacy of worker rights in the MIGA).
14. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1989));
see Perez-Lopez, Worker Rights, supra note 13, at 222 (describing OTCA). Section
301 gives the President broad discretionary power to punish a country, or a specific
product or industry, for worker rights violations that cause economic injury in the
United States. See also Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: Int'l
Worker Rights and Int'l Trade, 27 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 466-69 (1989)
[hereinafter Missing Link] (describing Section 301).
15. Pub. L. No. 102-182, § 203(c)(7), 105 Stat. 1233, 1238 (1991) (to be cod-
ified at 19 U.S.C. § 3202).
16. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-391, § 599, 106 Stat. 1633, 1696 (1992) (prohibiting use of
fiscal 1993 foreign assistance funds to support activities that contribute to violations
of worker rights).
17. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-87, § 547, 107 Stat. 931, 959 (1993) (prohibiting use of fiscal
1994 foreign assistance funds to support activities that contribute to violations of
worker rights). This legislation was enacted in response to revelations that United
States aid dollars were being provided to promote relocation of firms from the United
States to developing countries, using the promise of a union-free environment. See
138 CONG. REC. S15783-02 (1993) (statements of Sen. Byrd, Sen. Hollings, Sen.
Shelby, Sen. Dodd, and Sen. Wellstone) (criticizing Agency for International Develop-
ment [AID] funding of program to relocate manufacturing from the United States to
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"the adoption of international fair labor standards" as a United States
negotiating objective in the GATT.'9
Of all these laws incorporating worker rights standards, the GSP wor-
ker rights provisions provide the strongest remedy.' Countries that are
not "taking steps" to protect internationally recognized worker rights2'
El Salvador); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN ASSISANCE: U.S. Sup-
PORT FOR CARIBBEAN BASIN ASSEMBLY INDUSTRIES 50-59 (1993) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (assessing the impact of Section 599 on worker rights in Caribbean Basin
nations); NATIONAL LABOR COIMM. IN SUPPORT OF HUMiAN & WORKER RIGHTS IN
CENTRAL AM., PAYING TO LOSE OUR JOBS 59-62 (1992) [hereinafter PAYING TO
LOSE OUR JOBS] (describing United States assistance to Salvadoran firms that blacklist
union members). Even after Section 599 was enacted, AID funds continued to flow to
the Salvadoran free trade zones. See NATIONAL LABOR COMM,. EDUC. FUND IN SUP-
PORT OF WORKER & HUmiAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AM., FREE TRADE'S HIDDEN SE-
CRETS 17-18 (1993) [hereinafter FREE TRADE'S HIDDEN SECRETS] (revealing that AID
spent $8.9 million in 1993 to develop free trade zones in El Salvador); Tim
Shorrock, AID to Prohibit Funds for Projects that Cut U.S. Jobs, J. COMM., Jan. 12,
1994, at 1A (reporting issuance of AID guidelines prohibiting any use of funds to
finance projects that result in loss of jobs from the United States).
18. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-306, § 1621, 108 Stat. 1608, 1634 (1994) (requiring United
States Executive Directors of international financial institutions to advocate the adop-
tion of policies to guarantee worker rights).
19. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1986 (1974),
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-418,
§ 1101(b)(14), 102 Stat. 1107, 1125 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(14) (1989) (set-
ting forth the principal GATT negotiating objectives of the United States with regard
to worker rights); see Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade, supra note I, at 277-83 (de-
scribing United States efforts to incorporate worker rights conditionality into GATT;
Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and
the Int'l Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 91-95 (1990) [hereinafter Amato, Labor
Rights Conditionality] (recounting the failure of these efforts); Labor Advisory Comm.,
supra note 5 (characterizing the lack of worker rights standards as a "major
shortcoming" of the Uruguay Round agreement).
20. Neither CBERA, which is geographically limited to the Caribbean region, nor
OPIC contains procedures by which unions or human rights groups may petition for a
country's removal. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (1989) (providing for withdrawal of
CBERA benefits); 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1989) (providing for withdrawal of OPIC bene-
fits). In practice, a country that is suspended from GSP will be suspended from OPIC
as well. See Perez-Lopez, Worker Rights, supra note 13, at 226 (noting that for coun-
tries in the GSP program, OPIC follows the presidential determination of compliance
with the GSP worker rights criteria). While Section 301 does include such procedures,
petitioners must demonstrate that the offending country's worker right violations bur-
den or restrict United States commerce. See Missing Link, supra note 14, at 467
(explaining the injury test under Section 301).
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4) (1988) (defining internationally recognized worker
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may not legally participate in the GSPY Congress' purpose in incorpo-
rating worker rights language into the GSP was twofold: to improve
conditions for workers in developing countries; and to slow the exodus
of jobs from the United States.'
The law allows any interested party to petition the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to remove a country with worker rights
violation from the preference list. 4 Although the law also gives the
USTR the power to initiate investigations, the USTR has never exercised
this power.' After a public hearing by the GSP subcommittee, 6 the
rights as: "(a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, (d) a
minimum age for the employment of children; and (e) acceptable conditions with
regard to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational health").
22. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1988) (stating that "[t]he President shall not des-
ignate any country a beneficiary developing country under this section . . . (7) if
such country has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized
workers rights to workers in the country (including any designated zone in that
country"); 19 U.S.C. § 2464(b) (1988) (requiring that "the President shall . . . with-
draw or suspend the designation of any country if . . . as a result of changed cir-
cumstances such country would be barred from designation as a [beneficiary devel-
oping country]"). But see 19 U.S.C. 2462(b) (1988) (providing that a country that
violates worker rights may qualify for GSP "if the President determines such designa-
tion will be in the national economic interest of the United States and reports such
determination to the Congress with his reasons therefor").
23. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5101, 5111-12 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (stating Congress's beliefs
that "[tihe denial of internationally recognized worker rights in developing countries
tend [sic] to perpetuate poverty, to limit the benefits of economic development and
growth, [sic] to narrow privileged elites, and to sow the seeds of social instability
and political rebellion," and that "the lack of basic rights for workers in many LDCs
[less-developed countries] is a powerful inducement for capital flight and overseas
production by U.S. industries").
24. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(a) (1993). Interested parties are not limited to parties
with economic interests. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 5125-26 (evincing
Congressional intent that parties interested in protecting worker rights be granted equal
participation in the GSP process with parties showing an economic interest, including
an annual opportunity to submit testimony).
25. See 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(0 (1993)'(providing that the Trade Policy Staff Com-
mittee "may at any time, on its own motion, initiate any of the actions described in
[the regulations creating the petitioning process]"); Terry Collingsworth, International
Worker Rights Enforcement: Proposals Following a Test Case, at 7 n.19 [hereinafter
Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement] (on file with International Labor Rights
Educ. & Research Fund (ILRERF)) (explaining that USTR has never initiated a re-
view).
26. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.2(b)(4) (1993). The GSP Subcommittee is part of the Trade
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USTR may suspend or revoke the GSP privileges of any beneficiary
developing country that is not "taking steps" to afford internationally-
recognized worker rights. Since 1986, the USTR has removed or sus-
pended ten countries from GSP eligibility for varying periods of time.'
Critics argue that the GSP review process, in practice, suffers from
serious substantive and procedural deficiencies. Substantively, the
USTR has adopted a broad definition of "taking steps" and a narrow
Policy Staff Committee, comprising representatives of USTR, the Departments of Ag-
riculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, the Council on
International Economic Policy, and, in a non-voting capacity, the International Trade
Commission. 15 C.F.R. § 2002(a) (1993).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988).
28. See Actions Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 52 Fed. Reg.
49,137 (1987) (suspending Chile); Actions Concerning the Generalized System of
Preferences, 52 Fed. Reg. 389 (1987) (removing Romania and Nicaragua and suspend-
ing Paraguay); Actions Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 54 Fed.
Reg. 15,357 (1989) (suspending Burma and the Central African Republic); Actions
Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,299 (1990) (sus-
pending Liberia); Actions Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences, 56 Fed.
Reg. 19,539 (1991) (suspending Sudan); Actions Concerning the Generalized System
of Preferences, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,137 (1992) (suspending Syria); Actions Concerning
the Generalized System of Preferences, 58 Fed. Reg. 34,861 (1992) (suspending Mau-
ritania). Paraguay, Chile, and the Central African Republic, all removed from the GSP
in 1987, were reinstated in 1991. 137 CONG. REC. S1888-89 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1991).
In addition, Ethiopia, China, and South Korea have been removed from OPIC because
of worker rights violations. Compa, International Labor Standards, supra note 8, at
164-65.
29. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATi NAL TRADE: ASSESSmNT
OF THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES PROGRAM 100-13 (1994) [hereinafter
GSP ASSESS~mNT] (summarizing criticisms of GSP country practice provisions);
Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 5-21 (describing flaws
in the GSP review process); PETER DORMtAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER RIGHTs
& U.S. TRADE PoLicy: AN EVALUATION OF WORKER RIGHTS CoNDmoNALrry UN-
DER THE GENERAIrZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 5-9 (1989) (summarizing criticisms
of procedural and substantive practices of GSP worker rights reviews).
30. See DORMAN, supra note 29, at 8 (stating that, in practice, USTR has inter-
preted "taking steps" broadly to include countries' privately expressed assurances that
they will respect worker rights as well as actual legal and administrative reforms). At
least with respect to fundamental rights such as the freedom of association, Congress
intended countries to be subject to review until they comply with absolute standards.
See Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 12-13 & n.35 (ar-
guing that under the GSP, statute countries must continue to take steps until they
have fully complied with the worker rights standard); see also ILR. REP. No. 285,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2577 (defining "taking
steps" for purposes of OPIC to include whether the country "continues to make prog-
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interpretation of "worker rights."'" While the USTR has found that
even minimal progress constitutes "taking steps,"'32 it has concluded that
assassinations of union leaders are not worker rights violations.3
The USTR has also created procedural obstacles to worker rights en-
forcement. First, the petitioning requirement shifts the enforcement bur-
den from the USTR to worker rights advocates.3 4 Second, the GSP sub-
committee has refused to review, without explanation, petitions filed by
worker rights advocates.3' Third, the USTR created by regulation, with-
ress to implement internationally recognized worker rights"). With respect to labor
standards that vary with the country's level of economic development, the variable
nature of the right logically requires continuing review. See 130 CONG. REc. H-11574
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (remarking that the definition of worker rights should "be
interpreted commensurate with the development level of the particular country"); 1990
STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 8, at 1694 (noting that countries are expected to
take steps over time to achieve Worker rights standards).
31. See GSP ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 109 (describing USTR's policy of
distinguishing between worker rights and human rights violations); DORMAN, supra
note 29, at 7-8 (discussing USTR's distinction between worker rights and human
rights); Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 16-21 (criticizing
USTR's failure to apply worker rights standards). In particular, the GSP Subcommittee
has never taken official notice of the large body of caselaw and commentary provided
by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), although Congress apparently intended that
ILO jurisprudence address the GSP worker rights standards. See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 23, at 5112 (stating Congress's intent that USTR apply ILO worker rights stan-
dards); 1990 STATE DEP'T REPORT,,supra note 8, at 1693-94 (employing ILO stan-
dards to define scope of worker rights); GSP ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 99-100
(stating that the worker rights standards in GSP are those set by the ILO). It is un-
clear whether the Subcommittee's reliance on the testimony of an ILO expert in the
1993 El Salvador review hearing indicates a greater willingness to take account of
ILO standards. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (describing ILO expert's
testimony in GSP review hearing).
32. Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 8-15 (criticizing
USTR's decision that although Malaysia did not allow freedom of association and
collective bargaining, it would be considered to be "taking steps" under the GSP
statute).
33. See DORMAN, supra note 29, at 7-8 (stating that USTR has consistently de-
termined that abuses committed against unionists are not worker rights violations un-
less it is proven that the perpetrators intended to disrupt specific trade union activi-
ties); infra note 185 and accompanying text (applying the worker rights/human rights
distinction to El Salvador).
34. Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 8.
35. See GSP ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 108 (demonstrating that of 80 work-
er rights petitions filed with USTR from 1985 to 1993, only 46 were accepted for re-
view); DORMAN, supra note 29, at 5-6 (discussing USTR's discretionary review poli-
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out statutory foundation, a requirement that rejects the subsequent review
of a petition previously denied, unless the petitioners present "substantial
new information."3 Fourth, the USTR has placed countries "under re-
view" rather than suspending them.' These practices have led many
observers to conclude that the worker rights enforcement procedure is
thoroughly politicized.38
In 1990, a coalition of worker rights advocates" brought a lawsuit
charging the President, the USTR, and other government officials with
failure to enforce the statutory worker rights provisions of GSP.' The
District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that section 701(a)(2) of
the Administrative Procedure Act4' provided the agency with discre-
tionary authority over worker rights provisions because they (1) were so
vague that they gave the court "no law to apply" and (2) implicated
the President's inherent foreign affairs powers.'3 The District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed in a sharply divided opinion; one member of the
panel relied on a jurisdictional argument rejected by the lower court"
cy); Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality, supra note 19, at 116-17 (noting USTR's
refusal to accept petitions filed on El Salvador in 1986. 1987, and 1988).
36. 15 C.F.R. §§ 2007.0(b)(5), 2007.1(a)(4) (1993); see GSP ASsEssENT, supra
note 29, at 107-09 (discussing the new information requirement); Collingsworth, V/ork-
er Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 11 (arguing that under USTR's interpretation
of this provision, a country that makes minimal efforts to protect worker rights is
effectively immunized from further scrutiny).
37. See Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality, supra note 19, at 116 n.253 (report-
ing worker rights advocates' assertion that placing countries on review undermines
worker rights enforcement). But see DORtAN, supra note 29, at 5-7 (suggesting that
mandatory review may reduce the United States Government's leverage depriving it of
a graduated range of actions to pressure worker rights violators).
38. See Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 7 (conclud-
ing that the GSP Subcommittee "assumes the role of counsel to the beneficiary devel-
oping country"); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text (contending that work-
er rights laws are used to promote unrelated foreign policy objectives).
39. See Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 3 n.8 (list-
ing the members of the coalition).
40. International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
495 (D.D.C. 1990) [International Labor Rights I1], affld by a divided opinion, 954
F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988).
42. International Labor Rights II, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
43. See id. at 498 (stating that the complaint strikes directly at the President's
authority in a broad area of foreign relations).
44. International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
490 (1990) [International Labor Rights I] (finding that the United States District
Court, not the Court of International Trade, was the proper forum to hear actions to
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although conceded by the government on appeal,4' another based his
ruling on standing (an argument never raised on appeal by the govern-
ment),' and the third member dissented.47
B. POLICY DEBATES
Three principal positions emerge from the economic, political, and
legal debates over worker rights conditions. The first position, which
may be termed "low-wage internationalism," asserts the right of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) to relocate production from the United States
to developing countries with lower labor standards." The second posi-
tion of "high-wage nationalism," urged by many United States unions,
seeks to use worker rights provisions of trade laws to protect the jobs
and living standards of workers in the United States.49 Worker rights
enforce worker rights provisions of trade law).
45. See International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d
745, 746 (1992) (Henderson, J., concurring) (asserting that Court of International
Trade, not United States District Court, had jurisdiction).
46. See id. at 751 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (claiming that unions and human
rights organizations could meet neither injury nor redressibility tests and therefore
lacked standing).
47. See id. at 752 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (arguing that unions had standing to
seek review and that their claim was justiciable).
48. See, e.g., Calman J. Cohen, The Impact of Free Trade on Industry, in THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: LABOR, INDUSTRY, AND GOVERNMENT
PERSPECTIVrS 81, 82 (Mario J. Bognanno & Kathryn J. Ready eds., 1993) (arguing
that free trade causes United States firms to become more competitive).
49. See, e.g., Stephen Franklin, Unions Urge Clinton to Renegotiate Trade Pact,
CHI. TRiB., Feb. 18, 1993, at Bus. 3 (recounting efforts by United States unions in
industries that have suffered job losses to Mexico to impose conditions on United
States-Mexico trade). The position of the main United States trade union center, the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), is
further complicated by its historical and fiscal links to cold war foreign policy. Prior
to 1989, the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department and its regional Institutes
placed greater influence on combatting alleged communist influence in foreign labor
movements than on combatting the effects of multinational corporations. See infra
notes 186-93 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of this policy in El Salva-
dor). In 1985, the AFL-CIO's international operations budget was $43 million, 90 per-
cent of which came from the United States Agency for International Development
(AID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the United States Infor-
mation Agency (USIA). AL WEINRUB & WILLIAM BOLLINGER, THE AFL-CIO IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 16 (1987). The collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with the
increased pressure of global competition on the United States labor movement, have
mitigated this anticommunist zealotry. But the AFL-CIO's institutional links with the
state apparatus remain a peculiar feature of labor's international policy. See Paul
WORKER RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
advocates, including many in these same unions, argue that neither of
these approaches shows genuine concern for the rights of workers in
developing countries.O They urge a third position of "high-wage inter-
nationalism," which views protection of international worker rights as
one part of a global strategy to promote sustainable development and in-
crease consumption levels in developing countries.5 '
These conflicting approaches center on a fundamental economic ques-
tion: are low wages resulting from denial of worker rights a legitimate
component of a country's comparative advantage, or a political distortion
of the terms of trade?' This debate has sharpened as United States
MNCs have moved both industrial and, increasingly, service production
to low-wage developing countries.' Opponents of worker rights condi-
tionality claim that growth in developing countries and improvements in
social welfare can occur only if wages are kept low to attract foreign
investment5 ' Worker rights advocates, in contrast, argue that the eco-
Garver, Beyond the Cold War: New Directions for Labor Internationalism, 13 LAB.
RESEARCH REV. 61, 71 (1989) (arguing that the AFL-CIO must move beyond anti-
communism to international labor solidarity). But see Tom Kahn, Beyond Mythology:
A Reply to Paul Garver, 13 LAB. RESEARCH REV. 72, 79 (1989) (claiming that the
objectives of the AFL-CIO are not in conflict with United States interests).
50. See Collingsworth et al., New Deal, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that while
United States unions' support for worker rights legislation is seen as self-interested
protectionism, MNCs' advocacy of free-trade is perceived to represent the national
interest); see also 131 CONG. REc. H13048-04 (1985) (statement of Rep. Pease) (re-
jecting a debate on trade policy whose scope is limited to a choice between "free
traders" and "protectionists").
51. See JOHN CAVANAGH ET AL., TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 42 (1988) (stating that high-wage internationalism is
intended "to promote an open trading system in which the benefits of trade are
spread more broadly among nations").
52. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that
government policies may alter conditions of comparative advantage).
53. See Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act -
Plant Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMPLOY-
smENT & LAB. L. 72, 101 (1993) [hereinafter Collingsworth, Resurrecting the NLRA]
(discussing the impact of corporate relocations from the United States to developing
countries on industrial workers in the United States); FREE TRADE'S HIDDEN SECRETS,
supra note 17, at A1-27 (listing firms that have closed manufacturing plants in the
United States and opened production facilities in the Caribbean Basin).
54. See Gary S. Fields, Labor Standards, Economic Development, and Interna-
tional Trade, in BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR
STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 19, 21 (Stephen
Herzenberg & Jorge F. Perez-Lopez eds., 1990) (arguing that labor standards may
hamper employment, reduce competitiveness, and impede growth).
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nomic well-being of both developing and developed countries depends
on higher wages in developing countries."
The political controversy over protectionism closely tracks the eco-
nomic debate. Critics of worker rights laws suggest that they are mere-
ly a self-interested response of United States unions and their political
allies to increased competition from developing countries.56 Worker
rights advocates counter that the standards of United States worker
rights laws parallel those of the International Labor Organization (ILO),
and that the purpose of Congress in enacting these laws was "the pro-
motion of labor rights abroad, rather than the protection of domestic
industries."57
Opponents of conditionality further argue that unilateral worker rights
language in United States trade laws offends the principle of sovereign-
ty" and in some instances violates the GATT principle of non-discrimi-
nation.59 They contend that it is hypocritical for the United States,
which has refused to ratify the fundamental ILO conventions on worker
rights,' to impose its own concept of worker rights on other nations.6
55. See Richard Rothstein, Setting the Standard: International Labor Rights and
U.S. Trade Policy (Economic Policy Inst. Briefing Paper) (n.d.), at 1 (contending that
wage growth in developing nations benefits workers in both these countries and the
United States); Michael J. Piore, Labor Standards and Business Strategies, in BUREAU
OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 35, 46-47 (Stephen Herzenberg & Jorge F. Perez-
Lopez eds., 1990) (arguing that labor standards are necessary to effect a rapid transi-
tion from sweatshop conditions to high-wage production characterized by labor-man-
agement cooperation).
56. See Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards, supra note 8, at 77 (observing that
developed countries can demonstrate that international fair labor standards are not
protectionist by opening their markets to imports from countries that comply with
these standards).
57. Missing Link, supra note 14, at 460.
58. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled To-
wards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1, 1-9 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the legal concept of sovereignty in response
to the growing power of multinational corporations).
59. See Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality, supra note 19, at 105 (contending
that the worker rights provisions of the OTCA may violate the GATT principle of
non-discrimination). This complaint does not apply to the GSP, which operates as an
exception to the non-discrimination principle. See GATT, BISD 18 Supp. 24 (1972)
(establishing GSP as a waiver to the most-favored nation requirement of GATT Arti-
cle I); GATT, BISD 26 Supp. 203 (1980) (perpetuating GSP authority); see also
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 278-79 (discussing the status
of GSP in international law).
60. See Compa, International Labor Standards, supra note 8, at 163 (noting that
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If the United States wants to improve worker rights language, the proper
method is through multilateral negotiations.' Defenders of condi-
tionality respond that worker rights laws do not violate sovereignty
when they are intended to redress economic injury, or when they merely
withdraw a benefit unilaterally conferred on another country.' Further,
the United States has ratified only 11 of 174 ILO conventions); Convention Concern-
ing the Abolition of Forced Labour (Convention No. 105), entered into force Jan. 17,
1959 [hereinafter ILO Convention 105], reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OR-
GANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-1991
(1992) [hereinafter U-0 CONVENTIONS & RECOMMEINDATIONS], at 618 (indicating that
of all the conventions defining fundamental worker rights, the United States has rati-
fied only this Convention); Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the
ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. LJ. 48, 80 (1989) (suggesting that the
ratification of ILO Convention 105 in 1991 demonstrates a "new sense of enthusiasm"
for the ILO on the part of the United States); Convention Concerning Discrimination
in respect of Employment and Occupation (Convention No. 111), entered into force
June 15, 1960, reprinted in 1 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at
702 (indicating that the United States has not ratified this Convention); Convention
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Conven-
tion No. 87), entered into force July 4, 1950 [hereinafter ILO Convention 87J, re-
printed in 1 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMSIENDATIONS, supra, at 4; Convention con-
cerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain
Collectively (Convention No. 98), entered into force July 18, 1951 [hereinafter 1LO
Convention 98], reprinted in 1 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOStMENDATIONS, supra, at 7;
EDWARD E. POTTER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE & COL-
LECnvE BARGAINING 92 (1984) (arguing that United States ratification of ILO Con-
ventions 87 and 98 would offend sovereignty and violate constitutional principles).
61. See K. Schoenberger, The Model Here Isn't America, L.A. TIMiES, Jan. 30,
1992, at I (quoting criticism by Malaysia's foreign minister of United States worker
rights laws); see generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson, Sta-
tus of Treaties] (warning that making international agreements directly applicable with
higher status than domestic laws may undermine countries' democratic lawmaking
procedures and create distrust for international institutions).
62. See Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality, supra note 19 (asserting that Con-
gress has acted unilaterally where the United States has been unable to persuade its
trading partners to agree to international labor standards); Frank P. Doyle, Internation-
al Labor Standards: The Perspective of Business in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STAN-
DARDS & GLOBAL ECONOMI3C INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYPostutrm 43, 44
(Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor 1994) (suggesting that effective
worker rights standards must be negotiated between equal partners and accepted as
mutually advantageous); Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards, supra note 8, at 75 (pos-
ing "the dilemma of whether fair labor standards should be pursued bilaterally or
multilaterally").
63. See Missing Link, supra note 14, at 458-59 (arguing that where one state is
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they suggest that new concepts of international worker rights are trans-
forming the traditional definition of sovereignty. " Both advocates and
opponents of worker rights sanctions agree that, in practice, the United
States often uses these laws to promote foreign policy objectives unrelat-
ed to actual respect for worker rights.65
Finally, the worker rights provisions of United States trade statutes
may be unenforceable in federal courts. Generally, courts have refused
to extend the protections of United States labor laws extraterritorially to
protect either United States workers affected by plant closings' or for-
eign workers whose rights are violated by United States-based MNCs.67
economically injured by lack of worker rights in other states, its unilateral actions to
enforce these rights constitute permissible retorsion and its withdrawal of benefits
from these states is not coercive). But see id. at 459 (maintaining that labor rights
conditionality based purely on a human rights rationale would be a coercive violation
of sovereignty).
64. See Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question:
Two Case Studies--NAFTA and Guatemala, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 117
[hereinafter Compa, International Labor Rights] (arguing that worker rights advocates
challenge the traditional notion that labor relations are internal prerogatives of states);
Jackson, Status of Treaties, supra note 61, at 332 (conceding that the direct applica-
tion of international treaty norms with higher status than domestic legislation could
protect human rights or economic structures that would not be secured by national
constitutions).
65. See Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality, supra note 19, at 116 (asserting that
the Reagan Administration's selective withdrawal of GSP privileges was directed at
politically disfavored countries); Missing Link, supra note 14, at 463-64 (noting that
Nicaragua and Romania, among the first countries suspended from the GSP program,
had better labor rights records than many countries that were not suspended).
66. See Collingsworth, Resurrecting the NLRA, supra note 53, at 106 (arguing
that judicial interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act has created unnecessary
protections for United States companies that relocate production to developing coun-
tries).
67. See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191
(2d Cir.) (holding that section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act could not
be applied extraterritorially to a claim by Korean workers against their United States-
based multinational employer), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 493 (1992); cf Dowd v. In-
ternational Longshoremen's Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992) (granting preliminary
injunction against a United States union that allegedly violated the National Labor
Relations Act's ban on secondary boycotts by inducing Japanese unions to threaten
refusal to unload ships carrying non-union citrus); Coastal Stevedoring Co., 313 NLRB
412 (1993) (finding that a United States union violated the NLRA's secondary boycott
prohibition by inducing Japanese union's boycott threat), appeal docketed, No. 93-1812
(D.C. Cir. 1994). These decisions suggest that courts will apply United States labor
law extraterritorially only where the application aids corporate interests. See also Terry
Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying
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The International Labor Rights decision,' while reflecting no single
rationale, signals that the courts are unwilling to require the executive
branch to articulate its reasons for not protecting internationally-recog-
nized worker rights.'
II. WORKER RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
El Salvador remains primarily an agricultural country,' characterized
by extreme inequalities of wealth and political power.' Large-scale cof-
fee production, introduced in the late 19th century, caused massive dis-
location of subsistence farmers' and led to an uprising in 1932 that
was crushed at the cost of up to 30,000 lives 3 The development of
cotton production after World War II intensified land shortages and
poverty.74 Significant industrial export production75 also began at this
Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REV. 31, 47 & n.97 (1989) [hereinafter
Collingsworth, American Labor Policy] (arguing that while the NLRA gives some
weight to the interests of United States workers affected by runaway shops, it does
not consider the interests of foreign workers). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1990) (allowing Costa Rican banana plantation workers injured
by pesticides to sue a United States-based pesticide manufacturer in Texas courts by
abolishing the doctrine of forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991).
The Texas legislature recently reversed this decision. Act of February 23, 1993, S.B.
2, § 1, 73d Leg., 1st R.S. (to be codified at Tx. Ctv. PRAC. & RE.. CODE ANN.,
§ 71.051); see '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 479,
483 (rex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "the Texas legislature has recently abrogated
the Alfaro holding").
68. International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
69. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing the various judicial
rationales for refusing to order USTR to enforce the worker rights provisions of the
GSP).
70. See AmERICAS VATCH, EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR: HUMtAN RIGHTs
SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROiERO 1 (1991) [hereinafter EL
SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR] (stating that El Salvador's economy is overwhelm-
ingly agricultural).
71. See id. (noting that 20% of El Salvador's population receives 66% of the
national income).
72. See DAVID BROWNING, EL SALVADOR: LA TIERRA Y EL HOMBRE 261-364
(1975) (discussing the impact of coffee production on Salvadoran society).
73. EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR, supra note 70, at 2-3.
74. See BROWNING, supra note 72, at 365-438 (explaining the impact of cotton
production on the rural population).
75. See RAFAEL MENJIVAR, FORMACION Y LUCHA DEL PROLETARIADO INDUSTRI-
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time, accelerating in the 1960s under the auspices of the Alliance for
Progress.76 Deepening rural poverty and increasing tensions between the
coffee-producing oligarchy and an emerging stratum of industrialists'
led to the collapse of the government in 1979 and the resulting civil
war between the armed forces and the Farabundo Marti National Liber-
ation Front (FMLN)."
The war rearranged the map of Salvadoran society. El Salvador be-
came hyperdependent on United States military and economic assis-
tance.79 Military operations displaced a large part of the rural popula-
tion to the cities, and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the coun-
try.8 Poverty and unemployment increased."' The public sector grew
AL SALVADORE&O 96 (1979) (stating that the number of industrial workers in El Sal-
vador grew from 51,738 in 1951 to 148,165 in 1971).
76. See CYNTHIA ARNSON, EL SALVADOR: A REVOLUTION CONFRONTS THE UNIT-
ED STATES 19-23 (1982) [hereinafter ARNSON, REVOLUTION] (characterizing the Alli-
ance for Progress as a program of the Kennedy administration designed to prevent
Latin American revolutions through social reform and counterinsurgency).
77. See Jeffrey M. Paige, Coffee & Power in El Salvador, 28 LATIN AMER. RE-
SEARCH REV. 7 (1993) (describing the split of the Salvadoran ruling class into "agro-
financial" and "agro-industrial" factions).
78. See TOMMIE SUE MONTGOMERY, REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR: ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION (1982) (discussing the causes of El Salvador's civil war); ARNSON,
REVOLUTION, supra note 76 (analyzing the origins of the civil war in El Salvador);
RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS & DECEIT: THE U.S. AND EL SALVADOR (1984) (dis-
cussing the role of the United States in El Salvador's civil war).
79. See EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR, supra note 70, at 141 (stating that
the United States provided more than $4.5 billion in military and economic assistance
to El Salvador from 1980 to 1992); CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, CROSSROADS: CONGRESS,
THE PRESIDENT, AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1976-1993 231 & n.2 (1993) [hereinafter
ARNSON, CROSSROADS] (arguing that total United States aid during the 1980s, includ-
ing funds for covert operations, reached $6 billion); see also ARMS CONTROL & FOR-
EIGN POLICY CAUCUS, BANKROLLING FAILURE: UNITED STATES POLICY IN EL SAL-
VADOR & THE URGENT NEED FOR REFORM 5 (1987) [hereinafter BANKROLLING FAIL-
URE] (reporting that in the 1987 fiscal year, United States aid surpassed El Salvador's
contribution to its own budget).
80. See BANKROLLING FAILURE, supra note 79, at 19 (observing that half a mil-
lion displaced persons, or 10% of the population, live in squalor in refugee and
squatter camps); Elizabeth Kay Harris, Comment, Economic Refugees: Unprotected in
the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
269, 288 (1993) (reporting that the population of Salvadoran refugees in the United
States is estimated at 500,000 to 850,000); GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 45 n.5
(stating that in 1992, Salvadorans in the United States remitted $702 million to El
Salvador, more than the total value of El Salvador's exports).
81. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
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to encompass a large share of the workforce,' while industrial and
agricultural production declined.' Jose Napoleon Duarte became Presi-
dent in 1984 with the support of the United States." Unable to halt
either the war or the economic collapse, Duarte's Christian Democratic
Party lost control of the National Assembly to the right-wing ARENA
party in 1988;' in 1989 ARENA's leader, Alfredo Cristiani, became
President.' The end of the Cold War and the inability of either the
FMLN or the army to win a military victory set the stage for negotia-
tions.' On January 16, 1992, the civil war officially ended with the
signing of the Chapultepec Accords.' In 1994, ARENA won both the
presidency and control of a majority of the seats in the National Assem-
bly in elections supervised by the United Nations.'
RELATIONS, CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RiGHTS PRAcTICES FOR 1993, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 444 (Joint Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT] (esti-
mating that 40% of El Salvador's population lives in poverty); PETER SOLLIS, POVER-
TY ALLEVIATION IN EL SALVADOR 2-4 (Washington Office on Latin America. El
Salvador Issue Brief No. 2, 1993) (summarizing studies of the extent of poverty in El
Salvador); BANKROLLING FAILURE, supra note 79, at 19-20 (stating that the level of
underemployment and unemployment had reached 50%).
82. See David Mena, Neoliberalismo y sindicalismo en Latinoamirica: El Caso
de El Salvador in MODELO NEOLiBERAL Y SINDICATOS EN AMERCA LATINA 195, 197
(Holm-Detlev Kohler & Manfred Wannoffel eds., 1993) (discussing the growth of
public sector unions).
83. See BANKROLLING FAILURE, supra note 79, at 17-19 (detailing the deteriora-
tion of the Salvadoran economy as a result of the war).
84. See ARNSON, CROSSROADS, supra note 79, at 157-58 (describing assistance
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Agency for International
Development (AID) to the Duarte campaign in the 1984 elections); Carlos Acevedo,
El Salvador's New Clothes: The Electoral Process (1982-19S9), in A DECADE OF
WAR: EL SALVADOR CONFRONTS THE FUTURE 19, 28 (Anjali Sundaram & George
Gelber eds., 1991) (stating that the CIA spent S2 million to elect Duarte in 1984).
85. See Acevedo, supra note 84, at 30-31 (describing the results of the 1988
elections as an undisputable defeat for Duarte).
86. See id. at 33-34 (discussing the 1989 Presidential elections).
87. See George R. Vickers, The Political Reality After Eleven Years of War, in
IS THERE A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRAcY IN EL SALVADOR? 25, 36-37 (Joseph S.
Tulchin & Gary Bland eds., 1992) (identifying the end of the Cold War and the
FMLN's continued military strength as factors contributing to negotiations).
88. Acuerdos de Paz, Jan. 16, 1992 [hereinafter Chapultepec Accords], reprinted
in FRENTE FARABUNDO MARTI PARA LA LIBERACION NACIONAL, ACUERDOS HACIA
UNA NUEVA NAcION 52 (1992) [hereinafter ACUERDOS].
89. See JACK SPENCE ET AL., EL SALVADOR: ELECTIONS OF THE CENTURY 28-29
(1994) (summarizing election results); U.S. CrrzENs ELECTIONS OBSERVER MISSION,
FREE & FAIR?: THE CONDUCT OF EL SALVADOR'S 1994 ELECriONs (1994) (criticizing
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ARENA's strategy for economic reconstruction relies heavily on low-
wage export production, concentrated in export processing zones
(EPZs).9° Access to the United States market is crucial to the success
of this strategy. Of El Salvador's $383.2 million in exports to the Unit-
ed States in 1992, $18,747,565, or about five percent, entered duty-free
under the GSP.9  While the GSP program is not crucial to the
Salvadoran economy,' the possibility that El Salvador would be denied
access to GSP benefits was perceived as a threat by political leaders
who were attempting to regain the confidence of foreign investors.93
B. THE SALVADORAN LABOR MOVEMENT
El Salvador's labor movement is the product of decades of economic
and political conflict. Although artisan unions developed in the 1920s
under the influence of the Salvadoran Communist Party, they were se-
verely repressed after the 1932 uprising.9t As El Salvador industrialized
in the 1960s, however, the first large-scale union organizing occurred
among teachers and manufacturing employees.9 In addition, the Ameri-
can Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an arm of the AFL-
CIO, supported the formation of rural cooperatives." Increasing union
irregularities in the electoral process).
90. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (discussing working conditions
in export processing zones).
91. GSP ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 130.
92. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 22 (noting that participation in GSP is
generally low for Caribbean Basin countries that already have access to United States
markets under the CBERA). It is unclear whether suspending El Salvador from the
GSP program would affect its exports under the worker rights provisions of the
CBERA. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(e)(1) (1988) (providing for withdrawal of CBERA
benefits at the President's discretion).
93. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (describing the reaction of the
Salvadoran Government and business leaders to threats to suspend El Salvador's GSP
benefits); DORMAN, supra note 29, at 11 (noting the symbolic significance of GSP to
the Salvadoran government in view of its dependence on the United States).
94. See MENJIVAR, supra note 75, at 35-72 (describing the origins of the
Salvadoran labor movement).
95. See id. at 83-102 (recounting the growth of the labor movement in the
1960s); MAmO LuNGo, LA LUCHA DE LAS MASAS EN EL SALVADOR 93-116 (1987)
(analyzing the development of unions as a political force to 1979).
96. See BONNER, supra note 78, at 193 (stating that AIFLD helped to form rural
cooperatives in the 1960s, but was evicted by the military government in 1973);
LuNGO, supra note 95, at 64 (describing AIFLD activities in 1960s). After the 1979
coup, AIFLD returned to El Salvador and resumed its organizing, focusing on land
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opposition to the military government made union leaders principal
targets of right-wing death squads after the 1979 coup." Between 1980
and 1982, the military and death squads launched a systematic attack on
unions that resulted in the killing, torture, and disappearance of thou-
sands of union members.98
Two principal union coalitions emerged to occupy the narrow political
space created by the Duarte government.' The National Union of Wo-
rkers and Campesinos (UNOC), a coalition of unions and peasant coop-
eratives funded by AIFLD, formed Duarte's political base."° The Na-
tional Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) brought together most of
El Salvador's left-wing unions and popular organizations, including the
influential public employee associations."0 ' Tensions between the two
groups, based on both ideological and pragmatic considerations, subsided
after ARENA gained control of the legislature in 1988."
reform. BONNER, supra note 78, at 193.
97. See EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR, supra note 70. at 27 (stating that
the killing of union organizers during the early 1980s virtually ended union activity).
98. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing violations of worker
rights in El Salvador).
99. See LuNGO, supra note 95, at 73-88 (discussing the resurgence of trade union
activity after 1983).
100. See AIFLD, Worker Rights in El Salvador, June 10, 1988, at 15 (reporting
that according to UNOC leaders, army or police intervention in genuine labor disputes
had diminished since Duarte's election). Many Salvadoran unionists and United States
observers regarded AIFLD's efforts to construct a political base in the Salvadoran
labor movement as a component of the United States counterinsurgency strategy. See
Frank Smyth, Duarte's Secret Friends, 244 THE NATION 316 (1987) (quoting a 1986
memorandum prepared by the United States Embassy in San Salvador describing ef-
forts by AIFLD, the Embassy, and the Christian Democrats to "destroy" the UNTS);
LuNcO, supra note 95, at 77-80 (describing AIFLD influence within the Salvadoran
labor movement); BONNER, supra note 78, at 192-97 (observing that in 1983 AIFLD
received more than 95 percent of its budget from the United States government and
concluding that AIFLD's advocacy of land reform was motivated by United States
policy); GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 n.12 (stating that under a bilateral grant
with AID, AIFLD received $15 million for activities in El Salvador in fiscal years
1990 through 1993).
101. See Eliseo Ruiz, La Situaci6n de los Trabajadores Salvadorefios Durante la
Administraci6n Duarte 19-20 (on file with author) (describing the formation of the
UNTS).
102. See Phil Bronstein, Salvador Peace Plan Unites Labor, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19,
1989 (describing cooperation between the UNOC and the UNTS as an alliance
threatening the ruling Christian Democratic Party); JOAQuiN ARRIOLA PALO.ARS &
JOSE ANToNio CANDRAY ALVARADO, DERECHOS PROrHIIDOs: NEGoCIaCON CoLEcr-
wA Y SiNDicATOs EN EL SALVADOR 37-38 (1994) [hereinafter PROHuBrrED RIGHTs]
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C. WORKER RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
1. Violence Against Trade Unionists
The United Nations Truth Commission, created by the 1991 Mexico
Agreement between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN,' de-
scribes the climate of violence which existed in the country from 1980-
1992 as "a state in which certain elements of society were immune from
any governmental or political restraint and operated with the most open
impunity."" 4 The armed forces and death squads assassinated, tortured,
and kidnapped thousands of trade unionists, violently broke up strikes
and union meetings, and bombed and ransacked union offices. 5
(detailing the cooperation of UNOC and UNTS in 1990 to form a broad front, the
Intergremial, to combat the economic policies of the Duarte administration).
103. Acuerdo de Mexico, Apr. 27, 1991, § IV, reprinted in ACUERDOS, supra note
88, at 14, 18.
104. UNITED NATIONS, COMISION DE LA VERDAD PARA EL SALVADOR, DE LA
LOCURA A LA ESPERANZA 240-41 (1993) [hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT].
105. See, e.g., ILO, 243d Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El
Salvador, Cases Nos. 953, 973, 1016, 1150, 1168, 1233, 1258, 1269, 1273 and 1281)
(1986); ILO, 251st Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador,
Cases Nos. 953, 973, 1016, and 1168) (1987); ILO, 259th Report of the Comm. on
Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Case No. 1441) (1987); ILO, 265th Report of
the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Case No. 1168) (1989); ILO,
268th Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Case No. 1441)
(1989); ILO, 268th Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador,
Case No. 1494) (1989); ILO, 272d Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association
(El Salvador, Case No. 1273) (1990); ILO, 275th Report of the Comm. on Freedom
of Association (El Salvador, Cases Nos. 1441 and 1494) (1990); ILO, 277th Report
of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Case No. 1524) (1991); ILO,
279th Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Cases No. 1441
and 1494) (1991); ILO, 291st Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El
Salvador, Cases Nos. 1273, 1441, 1494, and 1524) (1993).
See also TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 172-202; AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, EL SALVADOR: 'DEATH SQUADS' - A GOVERNMENT STRATEGY (1988)
[hereinafter DEATH SQUADS]; Americas Watch, Petition Before the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative on Labor Rights in El Salvador, May 29, 1987 [hereinafter Americas
Watch 1987 Petition]; Americas Watch, Petition Before the U.S. Trade Representative
on Labor Rights in El Salvador, Apr. 22, 1988 [hereinafter Americas Watch 1988
Petition]; AMERICAS WATCH, LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1988) [hereinafter
LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR]; Americas Watch, Petition Before the U.S. Trade
Representative on Labor Rights in El Salvador, Mar., 1989 [hereinafter Americas
Watch 1989 Petition]; Americas Watch, Petition Before the U.S. Trade Representative
on Labor Rights in El Salvador, May, 1990 [hereinafter Americas Watch 1990 Peti-
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Since the signing of the peace accords, political violence has de-
clined."°6 The recent debate over El Salvador's respect for worker
rights has focused on the weaknesses of the country's labor laws and on
violations of internationally recognized worker rights in practice.
tion]; FENASTRAS (National Federation of Salvadoran Workers) & Labor Coalition
on Central America, Petition to Remove El Salvador from the List of Beneficiary
Developing Countries under the General [sic] System of Preferences, June 1. 1990
[hereinafter FENASTRAS Petition]; Worker Rights and the Generalized System of
Preferences: the AFL-CIO Petition to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
June, 1990 [hereinafter AFL-CIO 1990 Petition]; International Labor Rights Educ. and
Research Fund,, Pre-Hearing Brief, Oct. 20., 1993 [hereinafter ILRERF Pre-Hearing
Brief].
A particularly notorious case was the October 31, 1989 bombing of the office
of FENASTRAS, which killed nine union leaders and injured many more. See TRTH
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 126 (describing bombing of FENASTRAS
office). The Salvadoran government actually claims that the bombing was carried out
by FENASTRAS itself "in an effort to discredit labor reform in El Salvador." Gov-
ernment of El Salvador, 1992 GSP Rebuttal Brief, December 8, 1992, at 42 [herein-
after Government 1992 Rebuttal Brief]. The Truth Commission conclusively refuted
this explanation, finding no evidence to support the government's allegation and stro-
ngly criticizing its failure to conduct a thorough investigation. See TRUTH Co,.mms-
SION REPORT, supra note 104, at 131 (concluding that the government of El Salvador
had not complied with its obligation to guarantee the human rights of FENASTRAS
members); see also ILO, 288th Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El
Salvador, Cases Nos. 1273, 1441, 1494, and 1524), 26 (1993) (condemning the
Salvadoran government's failure to investigate the FENASTRAS bombing); see gener-
ally TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 146-154 (noting the Salvadoran
government's refusal to investigate the disappearance by the Salvadoran Air Force of
two members of FENASTRAS); it. at 196-202 (criticizing the Government's failure to
prosecute the well-known killers of Rodolfo Viera, head of the Salvadoran Institute
for Agrarian Transformation, and AIFLD advisers Michael Hammer and Mark Pearl-
man).
106. See GSP Subcommittee, 1992 GSP Annual Review, Worker Rights Review
Summary, at 3 (1993)(noting decline in violence against unions). But see 1993 STATE
DnP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 434-37 (describing political violence during 1993,
including the assassination of two FMLN candidates for the National Assembly in the
1994 elections); Tracy Wilkinson, Salvador President Vows to Get Full Truth Behind
Surge in Political Violence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at A14 (describing increase in
death squad attacks in 1993); A Return of Terror: Death Squads Again Threaten El
Salvador, PHI.A. INQUIRER, Nov. 12, 1993, at A26 (recounting death squad violence);
U.S. Trying to Stem El Salvador Killings, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1993 (reporting
death squad activities).
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2. Deficiencies in Salvadoran Labor Law
a. Freedom of Association
The Labor Code"° establishes procedures that all unions must follow
to obtain legal recognition from the Ministry of Labor.' These proce-
dures are highly prejudicial to unions. First, the Ministry of Labor often
rejects initial applications for recognition on narrow technical
grounds."° While in theory the law protects workers against being
fired for union activity once they have initiated the recognition pro-
cess,"' in practice employers frequently take advantage of the delay in
granting recognition to fire the union leadership."' Second, the Labor
Ministry often denies recognition for apparently arbitrary reasons."
Many unions have waited more than two years for responses to their
107. CODIGO DE TRABAJO (El Sal.) [hereinafter 1972 LABOR CODE], reprinted in
LEGISLACION LABORAL 19 (1990). The Labor Code was amended in 1994. CODIGO
DE TRABAJO (El Sal.) [hereinafter 1994 LABOR CODE], reprinted in I LEYES
LABORALES (Ricardo Mendoza Orantes ed., 1994); see infra note 232 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the amendment of the Labor Code). While the 1994 amendments
resolved some of the deficiencies in the 1972 Labor Code to which worker rights
advocates had objected, they failed to respond to the most serious criticisms. See
infra note 229 (describing the inadequacies of the 1994 Labor Code amendments).
Because the 1994 amendments left most of the 1972 Code intact, references in the
following discussion are to the 1972 Code unless specifically noted.
108. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 219. A parallel procedure exists for
public sector associations, which must apply to the Ministry of the Interior. See LA-
BOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 105, at 69-71 (describing Interior
Ministry's denial of recognition to public employee associations).
109. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992, S. Prt. No.
103-7, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 STATE DEP'T REPORT]
(concluding that the Salvadoran Government has used legal technicalities to impede
union registration); Letter from Ministry of the Interior to Association of Employees
of the Ministry of Justice (ASEMJ) (on file with ILRERF) (rejecting association's ap-
plication for recognition and requiring extensive changes in punctuation).
110. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 248.
111. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 13-17 (describing cases of
workers fired when they sought recognition for their unions).
112. See ILO, 291st Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association (El Salva-
dor, Case No. 1659) (1993) (criticizing as a violation of the freedom of association
the Salvadoran government's denial of recognition to a branch of the Port Workers'
Union (SIPES) on the grounds that employees of ports and employees of airports
could not belong to the same union); see also LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR,
supra note 105, at 38-40 (documenting denial of recognition to unions).
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applications."' Finally, even if a union wins recognition, the employer
may challenge the union's credentials before the Ministry of Labor or in
domestic courts through the process of decertification (impugnacidn).14
Once the employer initiates the decertification process, the Labor Minis-
try and the courts consider the union's recognition invalid and refuse to
protect union leaders from discharge or to enforce the union's attempts
to bargain." s As a result of these practices, which facially violate ILO
freedom of association principles,"6 few new unions obtained legal
recognition in 1992 or 1993"
b. The Right to Organization and Collective Bargaining
i. Constraints on Collective Bargaining
Although the Salvadoran Constitution establishes the right to collective
bargaining for "all workers,"". the Labor Code denies this right to
113. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 13-17 (recounting delays
in recognition).
114. See id. at 12-14 (describing decertification procedure). The legality of this
procedure, which has no foundation in the Salvadoran Constitution or Civil Code, is
questionable. Id. at 13 n.26. The 1972 Labor Code also permitted the Labor Minister
to dissolve unions without recourse to the courts, in violation of ILO standards. 1972
LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 230; see ILO, CoMMb. ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIA-
TION, DIGEST OF DECISIONS f 487 (1985) [hereinafter ILO DIGEST OF DECISIONS]
(declaring that administrative suspension of unions is a serious restriction of the free-
dom of association). Under the 1994 Labor Code, only the courts may dissolve a
union. 1994 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 230.
115. ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 13.
116. See ILO DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 91263 and I 281 (holding
that a government cannot require prior authorization to establish a union and observ-
ing that registration procedures that are complicated and lengthy or that vest broad
discretion in administrative authorities create serious obstacles to union formation and
effectively deny the right to organize).
117. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 13 (stating that no new
unions were recognized in 1992 or 1993); Government 1992 Rebuttal Brief, supra
note 105, at 11 n.15 (claiming that the Salvadoran government approved applications
of 42 unions between 1989 and 1992); BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAiRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: EL SALVADOR, 1990-1992 (1993) [herein-
after EL SALVADOR LABOR TRENDS] (noting that many of the applications approved
by the government were for local affiliates of existing unions, rather than new un-
ions); PROHIBITED RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 45 (reporting that of the 34 applica-
tions for union sub-sections approved between 1989 and 1993, only two were for new
sub-sections, while 32 were revivals of dormant subsections).
118. CONSTrrUCON, art. 39 (El Sal.).
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state and municipal employees" 9 and to agricultural workers.' The
Salvadoran government argues that denying the legal right of collective
bargaining to public sector workers is inconsequential because in prac-
tice public employees do bargain collectively and strike. 2 ' But such de
facto bargaining gives workers little protection.' Private sector work-
ers do not fare much better; sanctions against employers who refuse to
bargain in good faith are weak and rarely enforced."z
119. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 2(b) (denying collective bargain-
ing rights to state and municipal employees).
120. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, arts. 264-67 (providing for establish-
ment of a tripartite commission to draft collective bargaining procedures for rural
workers). Because this commission was never constituted, agricultural workers effec-
tively had no bargaining rights under the 1972 Labor Code. See 1992 STATE DEP'T
REPORT, supra note 109, at 402-03 (discussing restrictions on agricultural workers'
right to collective bargaining); Government of El Salvador, Response to Petitions to
Review El Salvador's Status as a Beneficiary Developing Country Under the General-
ized System of Preferences, Sept. 12, 1990, at 12 (asserting that organization and
strikes by agricultural workers are permitted by the Constitution, although prohibited
by the Labor Code); see also ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 61-62
(criticizing a Salvadoran government proposal to extend limited bargaining rights to
agricultural workers). The 1994 amendments to the Labor Code eliminate the tripartite
commission. 1994 LABOR CODE, supra note 105, arts. 264-67 (repealed). Agricultural
workers are now permitted to organize as either "enterprise" or "mixed enterprise"
unions. Id., art. 209. Because every union must have at least 35 members, and few
agricultural establishments employ this many permanent workers, in practice farm
workers must organize in "mixed enterprise" unions, which are defined as unions
representing employees of two or more "neighboring" enterprises each of which has
no more than 25 workers. Id. Critics of the 1994 amendments feared that the Labor
Ministry would use the "neighboring" requirement to prevent unions from organizing
agricultural enterprises with a common owner, but located in different parts of the
country. Letter from ILRERF to USTR, Dec. 16, 1993, at 2-3 (on file with ILRERF).
121. See Government of El Salvador, Amended GSP Rebuttal Brief, Mar. 1, 1993
[hereinafter Government Amended Rebuttal Brief], at 11 (noting that the freedom of
collective bargaining is guaranteed by the Constitution for both private and public
employees).
122. See AFL-CIO Statement to GSP Subcomm., Oct. 1992, at 3-4 (discussing the
refusal of the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Labor to bargain with
associations representing their employees).
123. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 18 (discussing cases of
denial of collective bargaining rights to private sector workers). A significant practi-
cal limitation on the right to organize is the requirement that only local unions, not
federations or confederations, can negotiate collective bargaining agreements. See
PROHIBITED RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 85 (explaining that the limitation of bargain-
ing to local unions leads to fragmentation of the labor movement).
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ii. Restrictions on the Right to Strike
The Salvadoran Constitution guarantees the right to strike. 2' But this
right is restricted for public employees" and agricultural workers."
Those workers who do have a theoretical right to strike have found it
nearly impossible to strike legally.'" Since the 1972 Labor Code re-
quired unions to go through an elaborate procedure of obligatory media-
tion and arbitration without setting time limits,'" employers and the
Labor Ministry delayed indefinitely the declaration of a legal strike.'"
Workers who strike illegally-historically, nearly all workers-can be
dismissed without compensation." In addition, as recently seen in Oc-
tober 1993, the government deploys broad emergency powers to declare
strikes illegal and fire union leaders.' 3'
iii. Firings for Union Activity
The Labor Code prohibits discrimination or reprisals against workers
on account of union activity,' as well as specifically protects mem-
bers of union executive boards from dismissal.' Nonetheless, employ-
ers commonly dismiss workers who attempt to organize.'"' Because the
124. CONSTrrucION, art. 48 (El Sal.).
125. CONSTrUCION, art. 221 (El Sal.).
126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing limitations on agricul-
tural workers' rights to organize and bargain). Moreover, where unions' access to
workers is restricted, effective strikes are unlikely. Id.
127. See LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 105, at 54-61 (describing
the three principle ways in which the right to strike is impeded).
128. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, arts. 480-566. The 1994 amendments es-
tablish time limits of 20 days for direct negotiations. 1994 LABOR CODE, supra note
107, art. 489. There are 15 days for mediation. Id. art. 496.
129. See LABOR RIGHMS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 105, at 54 (noting delays
inherent in procedures for calling a legal strike).
130. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 554; see ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief,
supra note 105, at 19 n.59 (noting that the last legal strike in El Salvador occurred
in 1987).
131. See FENASTRAS (National Federation of Salvadoran Workers). Informe
Sobre las Violaciones a los Derechos Laborales y Sindicales en El Salvador, Oct.,
1993 (on file with ILRERF) [hereinafter FENASTRAS Report] (describing the
government's use of Decree 296, an emergency law enacted by the revolutionary junta
that briefly held power in 1980, to suppress a strike by workers at the National Pen-
sion Institute).
132. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 205.
133. 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 248.
134. See 1992 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 109, at 403 (remarking that in
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Labor Code does not give illegally fired workers the right to reinstate-
ment,1 35 the only cost to the employer is a small amount of severance
pay. 136
iv. Company Unions
While the Salvadoran Labor Code bars employers from setting up
"company unions,' ' 37 this practice, termed solidarismo,'  is wide-
spread and increasing, and in some cases actively promoted by the gov-
ernment.139 The National Union of Workers and Campesinos (UNOC)
some cases, workers who attempt to form unions are fired before they receive their
union credentials); See also ILRERF, Pre-hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 20-24
(listing cases of workers fired for union activity); LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR,
supra note 105, at 42-45 (noting cases of retaliatory firings).
135. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, arts. 251, 420 (providing remedies
for illegal dismissal of fines and limited back pay). These remedies are clearly inade-
quate by the standards of United States law. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941) (declaring that denial of a reinstatement remedy would "sanction a
most effective way of defeating the right of self-organization").
136. See FENASTRAS Report, supra note 131 (noting case of fired workers who,
despite winning judgments from the labor courts, have still not received severance
pay). Another way in which employers minimize the costs of severance pay is to
keep workers on year-to-year contracts, preventing them from accumulating severance
pay rights. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (describing the use of annual
contracts in El Salvador's export processing zones). While the Labor Code provides
for fines, in practice these are almost never imposed. See Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, 1991 GSP
Annual Review, Worker Rights Review Summary (1992), at 5 (citing United States
Embassy report concerning Salvadoran employers' practice of making severance pay-
ments to illegally discharged workers).
137. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, art. 205 (prohibiting interference
with or discrimination because of union activities).
138. See KURT PETERSEN, THE MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA 123
(1992) (defining solidarismo as a theory of cooperative industrial relations between
workers and employers that promotes economic empowerment and labor-management
harmony).
139. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 24-27 (describing cases of
parallel unions); see also LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 105, at 53 (as-
serting that the Salvadoran government has sponsored the formation of parallel worker
associations to weaken militant unions); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988) (making it
illegal for a United States employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial aid or other assistance
to it"); Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 (1992) (interpreting ban on domination or
interference to prohibit employer-sponsored "teams" or "councils"), enfd, 35 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 1994). The 1994 Labor Code permits voluntary bargaining with un-
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estimates that there are about forty solidarista associations in businesses
throughout the country.'
c. Labor Rights Violations in the Export Processing Zones
The GSP statute specifically addresses worker rights violations in
Export Processing Zones (EPZs)." ' Although the Salvadoran govern-
ment has asserted that miorkers in the zones have no desire to join un-
ions," in fact, employers in the EPZs have successfully resisted sever-
al organizing efforts.' 3
Export processing zones are crucial to the Salvadoran government's
economic development strategy.'" There are currently five functioning
EPZs (San Bartolo,'" El Progreso, San Marcos, El Pedregal, and San
Rafael) with another seven planned.'" Between 1985 and 1993, foreign
ions that represent less than a majority of workers, which may facilitate solidarismo.
PROHmIED RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 84.
140. UNOC, Casos de Violaci6n a la Libertad Sindical Ocurridos en los Ultimos 3
Alos [Cases of Violation of Trade Union Freedoms in the Past Three Years], Mar.
1993 (on file with ILRERF) [hereinafter UNOC Report]; see FENASTRAS Report,
supra note 131 (describing cases of parallel unions).
141. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988) (authorizing suspension of GSP benefits
because of worker rights violations in a "country (including any designated zone of
that country)"); see also Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker
Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE. J. INT'L L 173, 188-90 (1992) (not-
ing Congressional concern for worker rights in EPZs through its inclusion of a new
worker rights reporting requirement in the 1988 Trade Act).
142. See Government Amended Rebuttal Brief, supra note 121. at 7-8 (claiming
that workers in EPZs have no desire to form unions).
143. See 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 403 (concluding that com-
panies in the EPZs are hostile toward unions and have fired workers who attempted
to organize); ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 35-38 (recounting unsuc-
cessful organizing campaigns at Formosa Textiles and Satellite International): ILRERF
Post-Hearing Reply Brief, Nov. 10, 1993 at 4 (noting firing of union executive com-
mittee at S & C Apparel after workers attempted to organize).
144. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 27 (describing the Salvadoran govern-
ment's aggressive promotion campaign to encourage foreign investment in Salvadoran
EPZs).
145. See Joaquin Arriola, Los Procesos de Trabajo en la Zona Franca de San
Bartolo (n.d.) at 477 (unpublished manuscript, on file with ILRERF) (citing statistics
on EPZ employment).
146. Zonas Francas: Tesoro a Explotar, LA PRENSA GRAFICA, Mar. 29, 1993, at
8; see 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 403 (stating that there are cur-
rently two functioning EPZs and two more under construction). But see ILRERF Pre-
Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 31 (stating that there are currently five functioning
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investment in the EPZs increased from $400,670 to $16,145,900, while
the number of employees rose from 1281 to 30,380."4 Projections of
future employment go as high as 114,774."4 The United States has
actively promoted investment in the EPZs by United States compa-
nies. 49
Salvadoran customs law exempts offshore assembly plants from duties
on both the value of materials imported for re-export and the percentage
of value added in reassembly, plus an additional eight percent of value
added. 5 The Minister of the Economy can declare any enterprise,
whether or not it is located in one of the denominated zones, a "fiscal
area" entitled to the same relief from export duties. 5 ' In addition,
plants located in the EPZs may contract out work to factories in other
parts of the country.' 2
To deter union organizers, employers do not permit non-employees to
enter the export processing zones.'53 The Salvadoran government sup-
EPZs with another seven under development).
147. See De gran beneficio son inversiones asiaticos, LA PRENSA GRAFICA, July
17, 1993, at 6 (citing data provided by FUSADES [Salvadoran Development Founda-
tion]).
148. See Arriola, supra note 145, at 47 (citing USAID projections of future EPZ
employment). But see GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 38 (questioning the future
growth of Salvadoran EPZs after the cutoff of United States aid).
149. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 27 (stating that the United States has
provided $24.8 million to the FUSADES, of which $5 million was specifically target-
ed for EPZ development); id. at 28 (noting that in 1988, AID created a $20 million
credit line to support investment in Salvadoran EPZs); id. at 41 (stating that
Salvadoran firms considered AID technical assistance crucial to winning contracts from
United States companies).
150. Arriola, supra note 145, at 51; see FREE TRADE'S HIDDEN SECRETS, supra
note 17, at 17-18 (stating that AID has offered incentives to United States companies
to relocate to Salvadoran EPZs).
151. Arriola, supra note 145, at 50; see GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 37 (stat-
ing that approximately 90 percent of the assembly plants receiving preferential cus-
toms and tax treatment under Salvadoran law are located outside the EPZs).
152. ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 22 (describing contracting out
from EPZ firms to employers outside the zones).
153. See 1992 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 109, at 403 (stating that a civil-
ian manager denies union organizers with access to the San Bartolo EPZ).
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ports this policy. 4 Employers also use blacklists to keep organizers
out of the EPZs."
EPZ employers take other measures to restrict the right to organize.
Most zone companies maintain year-to-year employment contracts that
prevent employees from accruing vacation and severance pay rights.'"
Internal personnel policies prohibit not only non-employee organizers,
but also employees themselves from organizing, even on non-working
time.1
d. Forced Labor, Child Labor, and Working Conditions
ILO Convention 105158 prohibiting forced labor is one of only six
conventions ratified by the Salvadoran government."9 Nevertheless,
154. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Policy Staff Comm.,
Generalized System of Preferences Subcomm., GSP Annual Review Public Hearing,
Oct. 15, 1992, at 152 [hereinafter 1992 GSP Review Hearing] (testimony of Ambassa-
dor Miguel Angel Salaverria). This policy clearly contravenes ILO principles. See ILO
DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 91 220 (emphasizing the importance of guar-
anteeing union officials' access to plantations). It also contradicts assurances made by
El Salvador to the United States. See DESIGNATION OF NINE CARIBBEAN BASIN
COUNTRIES As BENEFCIARIES UNDER THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY
ACT: COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF rHE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 98-
159, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1984) [hereinafter Caribbean Basin Countries] (reporting
that the Salvadoran government, as a condition of beneficiary status under the CBER-
A, promised to permit union organizers to meet with workers within the San Bartolo
EPZ).
155. See PAYING TO LOSE OUR JOBS, supra note 17, at 59 (noting that the extent
of blacklisting was revealed in 1992 when an AID official informed a union investi-
gator posing as a United States textile manufacturer that zone managers maintained a
blacklist of known union members); ILO, 177th Report of the Comm. on Freedom of
Association (El Salvador, Case No. 844) (1978), 11 276 (declaring that blacklisting
constitutes a serious threat to the free exercise of trade union rights).
156. See Arriola, supra note 145, at 54-55 (describing employer practice of annual
contracts).
157. This policy clearly would be illegal in the United States. See Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that employers may not prohibit
union solicitation by employees on company property during non-working hours).
158. ILO Convention 105, supra note 60.
159. The others are: Convention Concerning Workmen's Compensation in Agricul-
ture (Convention No. 12) (entered into force Feb. 26, 1923), reprinted in I ILO CoN-
VENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 39; Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Penal Sanctions for Breaches of Contract of Employment by Indigenous
Workers (Convention No. 104) (entered into force June 7, 1958), reprinted in 11 LO
CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 587; Convention Concerning
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Popula-
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compulsory labor provisions of the Salvadoran Penal Code have drawn
criticism from the ILO.w Violations of minimum age laws are
widespread and inspections by the Ministry of Labor are "insufficient to
enforce the law."'' A national Minimum Wage Council establishes
minimum wages,'62 but minimum wage increases have not kept pace
with inflation.63 Approximately forty percent of El Salvador's popula-
tion now lives below the official poverty line." The government does
little to enforce laws protecting workers' safety and health. Outdated
standards, lack of resources, and corruption are the principal obstacles to
enforcement.' 5
e. Lack of Fair Judicial Review
The Labor Code provides for judicial review of some actions of the
Minister of Labor.'" Human rights monitors, however, have accused
the Salvadoran judiciary of political bias'67 and corruption.' The
Chapultepec Accords call for the establishment of a National Judicial
Council, independent of the government and political parties, to propose
tions in Independent Countries (Convention No. 107) (entered into force June 2,
1959), reprinted in I ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at
627; Convention Concerning Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled
Persons) (Convention No. 159) (entered into force June 20, 1985), reprinted in 2 ILO
CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 1278; and Convention Con-
cerning Labour Statistics (Convention No. 160) (entered into force Apr. 24, 1988),
reprinted in 2 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 1325.
160. 1992 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 109, at 403; see ILO, Comm. of Ex-
perts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual Observation
Concerning Convention No. 105 (El Salvador) (1990) (noting Salvadoran government's
failure to bring national legislation into conformity with ILO Convention' 105).
161. 1992 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 109, at 403.
162. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, arts. 149-159.
163. EL SALVADOR LABOR TRENDS, supra note 117, at 5.
164. 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 444.
165. See id. (discussing deficiencies of safety and health enforcement); Statement
of Rudy Oswald, AFL-CIO, to the GSP Subcommittee, Oct. 1991, at 3 (reporting that
according to the Salvadoran Labor Ministry, 52,805 inspections during the period from
June 1, 1990 to May 31, 1991 produced only 15,800 colones (US $1,975) in fines
for violations of labor code standards).
166. See 1972 LABOR CODE, supra note 107, arts. 572-93 (establishing procedures
for judicial review of actions by the Ministry of Labor).
167. See 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 438 (stating that the
Salvadoran judiciary, which is only nominally independent, was weakened by political
pressures).
168. See id. at 443 (noting the problem of corruption in the labor courts).
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judicial nominees."' While the Salvadoran Assembly passed a law pur-
porting to establish such a Council in 1992, the United Nations Truth
Commission'7" has raised serious questions concerning the Council's
political independence.' The Truth Commission has recommended re-
forms to create an independent judiciary, separate from administrative
agencies and not subject to the direct political control of the ruling par-
ty172
f. Effects of Worker Rights Violations on the Labor Movement
Systematic violations of worker rights have produced a weak and
fragmented labor movement in El Salvador." Although there are cur-
rently 112 unions and public-sector associations, organized in six major
federations," the vast majority of Salvadoran workers have no union
representation. In 1993, unions represented only 11.17% of El Salvad-
or's labor force,"5 and a mere 3.74% of workers were covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements. 76  Most of these contracts did little
more than reiterate provisions of the Labor Code.'"
169. Chapultepec Accords, supra note 88, Ch. 3, § I(A).
170. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment
and activities of the Truth Commission).
171. See TRUTH CONSUSSION REPORT, supra note 104. at 246 (criticizing proposed
judicial reforms); 1993 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 81, at 438 (stating that re-
forms of the judiciary leave power concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Court,
although some of the recent reforms may ameliorate this problem).
172. See TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 244-46 (recommending
reforms to create an independent judiciary).
173. See PRoHIBrrED RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 40 (stating that Salvadoran un-
ions are afflicted by low levels of affiliation, fragmented organization, and duplication
of structures).
174. Id. at 38. The federations are: National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UN-
TS); National Union of Workers and Campesinos (UNOC); National Federation of
Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS); General Confederation of Unions (CGS); Federa-
tion of Construction Industry Unions (FESINCONSTRANS); and General Confedera-
tion of Workers (CGT). Id.
175. See id. at 48 (reporting the results of a survey of labor union membership
and collective bargaining agreements).
176. Id. at 55.
177. Id. at 95.
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III. USING THE GSP PROCESS TO ENFORCE WORKER RIGHTS
A. THE AMERICAS WATCH PETITIONS, 1987-1989
In 1987, Americas Watch17 1 petitioned the USTR to suspend El
Salvador's GSP benefits. 7 9 USTR refused to accept the petition, stat-
ing that the documented abuses against unionists did not constitute vio-
lations of their internationally-recognized worker rights because, accord-
ing to the State Department, the victims were members of unions
"known by the U.S. Government to be front organizations of the insur-
gent FMLN."'80
Despite Congressional pressure, 8' USTR rejected subsequent peti-
tions by Americas Watch in 1988 and 1989. '82 USTR offered several
reasons for its refusal. First, it argued that the Salvadoran government
was not responsible for the killing, torture, and disappearance of trade
unionists carried out by unknown death squads."3 Second, USTR
178. See Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas
Watch's Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 49, 89-93 (1993) (discussing the impact of America Watch's human rights
monitoring on the Salvadoran government's policies).
179. Americas Watch, Testimony Before the U.S. Trade Representative on Labor
Rights in El Salvador, Oct. 1987, at I (documenting violations including killings,
imprisonment, and disappearances of union leaders).
180. Letter from USTR to Americas Watch (Aug. 14, 1987) (on file with
ILRERF) (stating reasons for refusal to accept labor rights petition).
181. See, e.g., Letter from 23 members of Congress to Clayton Yeutter, USTR
(Oct. 13, 1988) (on file with ILRERF) (requesting that USTR review Americas Watch
1988 Petition); Letter from 116 members of Congress to Carla Hills, USTR (July 14,
1989) (on file with ILRERF) (requesting that USTR review Americas Watch 1989
Petition).
182. See Americas Watch 1990 Petition, supra note 105 (noting rejection of 1988
and 1989 petitions).
183. GSP Subcommittee, GSP Subcommittee Rationale for Non-Acceptance of
Worker Rights Petition on El Salvador, Aug. 22, 1988. In fact, human rights investi-
gators and journalists have extensively documented links between the government and
the death squads. See TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 181 (stating
that military and civilian officials participated in, promoted, and tolerated death squad
activities); DEATH SQUADS, supra note 105 (arguing that death squads were a compo-
nent of the Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency strategy); Clifford Krauss, U.S.,
Aware of Killings, Kept Ties to Salvadoran Rightists, Papers Suggest, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1993 (identifying Salvadoran Vice-President Francisco Merino and ARENA
presidential candidate Armando Calderon Sol as death squad organizers). Moreover,
the Salvadoran government bears responsibility for the actions of private parties that
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claimed that arrested union members may have been involved in "illegal,
politically-motivated criminal activities."'" Third, USTR argued that an
arrest, killing, or other abuse does not violate worker rights unless it is
intended specifically to keep workers from exercising their rights to
associate, organize, and bargain collectively."
B. AIFLD ATTACKS AMERICAS WATCH
AIFLD, which supported the Duarte government,'" opposed suspen-
sion of El Salvador's GSP benefits.' When Americas Watch criticized
AIFLD's activities and called for Congressional review of the Institute's
funding," AIFLD issued a report"s  accusing Americas Watch of
pro-FMLN bias for reporting attacks on UNTS unions, calling the un-
violate internationally recognized worker rights. See ILO, 234th Report of the Comm.
on Freedom of Association (El Salvador, Case No. 1237), 213 (stating that govern-
ments have the responsibility to ensure a climate free from violence in which trade
union rights can be freely exercised).
184. Americas Watch 1988 Petition, supra note 105, at 2 (citing letter from J.
Edward Fox, legislative liaison, Dep't of State, to Sen. Tom Harkin, Mar. 22, 1988);
see Americas Watch, Testimony Before the GSP Subcommittee Concerning Worker
Rights in El Salvador (1987), at 9 (noting that the Salvadoran armed forces may
consider legitimate union activities, such as strikes or collective bargaining, to be
political crimes). In defining what constitutes a violation of the freedom of associa-
tion, the ILO has attempted to strike a balance between the exercise of trade union
functions and activities of a purely political character. See ILO DIGEST OF DECISIONS,
supra note 114, 353 (holding that governments should not interfere with a union's
functions because of its relationship with a political party); cf. id., 9I 355 (admonish-
ing unions against purely political actions).
185. Letter from Clayton Yeutter, USTR, to Americas Watch (Aug. 28, 1987); see
Letter from Clayton Yeutter, USTR to Holly Burkhalter, Americas Watch, Aug. 24,
1988 (criticizing Americas Watch for concentrating too much on worker rights and
too little on human rights issues); Americas Watch 1989 Petition, supra note 105, at
16-17 (citing instances where USTR demanded substantial evidence of Salvadoran
government's intent to violate labor rights).
186. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (describing links between AIFLD
and the Duarte administration).
187. See Kahn, supra note 49, at 78 (stating that the AFL-CIO believed in 1988
that calling for suspension of El Salvador's GSP benefits was unwarranted).
188. See LABOR RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 105, at 102-03 (stating that
AIFLD used United States aid to set up parallel unions).
189. AIFLD, A Critique of the Americas Watch Report on Labor Rights in El
Salvador, June 10, 1988, (on file with ILRERF) [hereinafter AIFLD Critique]; see
Americas Watch, Americas Watch Critique of AIFLD Critique on "Labor Rights in El
Salvador," July 5, 1988 (on file with ILRERF) (responding to AIFLD criticisms of
Americas Watch report).
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
ions guerrilla fronts,"9 while allegedly ignoring FMLN violations of
worker rights. 9 Following the AIFLD report, an open letter from
UNOC condemned Americas Watch as an FMLN dupe." Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin America Elliott Abrams joined the fray,
attacking Americas Watch Vice-Chair Aryeh Neier as "a violent partisan
who hates Ronald Reagan and is determined to have no enemies to his
left." 193
C. REALIGNMENT, 1990-1993
With the end of the Cold War and the opening of negotiations be-
tween the FMLN and the Salvadoran government, 94 a political realign-
ment occurred in both the Salvadoran labor movement and the AFL-
CIO. In early 1989, UNTS and UNOC forged an uneasy alliance against
the Christian Democratic government.9 The AFL-CIO, meanwhile,
shifted its position on trade sanctions and, in 1990, filed its first GSP
petition against El Salvador." The USTR accepted this petition, along
with petitions filed by other unions and by Americas Watch." USTR
kept these petitions under review until July, 1994.'98 As violence
190. See AIFLD Critique, supra note 189, at 7-15 (accusing UNTS of pursuing a
strategy of revolutionary violence).
191. See id. at 27 (arguing that the Duarte government was not deliberately vio-
lating worker rights).
192. See Letter from UNOC to Tom Kahn, AFL-CIO (Aug. 2, 1988) (on file with
ILRERF) (characterizing the Americas Watch report as an instrument of an FMLN
strategy to undermine the Salvadoran Government).
193. Morton Kondracke, Americas Watch: Human Rights or Politics?, WASH.
TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1988.
194. See Vickers, supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the factors
motivating the peace negotiations).
195. See Bronstein, supra note 102 (describing pact between UNOC and UNTS).
196. See generally AFL-CIO 1990 Petition, supra note 105, at 19-37.
197. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at I n.2 (listing 1990 peti-
tioners).
198. See GSP Subcomm., Trade Pol'y Staff Comm., USTR, 1990 GSP Ann. Rev.,
Worker Rights Rev. Summary 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Worker Rights Review]
(recommending continuation of review of El Salvador); GSP Subcomm., Trade Pol'y
Staff Comm. USTR, 1991 GSP Ann. Rev., Worker Rights Rev. Summary 6 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Worker Rights Review] (continuing review); GSP Subcomm., Trade
Pol'y Staff Comm., USTR, 1992 GSP Ann. Rev., Worker Rights Rev. Summary 4
(1993) [hereinafter 1992 Worker Rights Review] (continuing review); Trade Briefs, J.
CoMM., Dec. 29, 1993 (reporting continuation of review); USTR Trade Policy Staff
Comm., Notice of the Results of the 1993 Annual GSP Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,970,
35,971 (1994) (finding El Salvador to be taking steps to afford internationally recog-
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against unions diminished, the focus of this review shifted to the reform
of El Salvador's labor laws. 99
IV. THE EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC PRESSURE
ON EFFORTS TO REFORM EL SALVADOR'S LABOR LAWS
A. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORUM
The principal locus of attempts to reform Salvadoran labor law has
been the Economic and Social Forum, a tripartite body with equal repre-
sentation of labor, business, and government, with the goal of planning
for the social and economic development of the country. The main
objective of the government and private sector in the Forum was to
offer sufficient assurances of reform to protect El Salvador's GSP bene-
fits without significantly altering existing industrial relations practices or
shifting the balance of power between capital and labor.' The unions'
goal, when the Forum convened in September of 1992, m was not la-
bor law reform but rather to develop immediate measures that would
alleviate the effects of the government's economic adjustment policies
on El Salvador's workers.2 3 The unions viewed the insistence of the
nized worker rights and terminating review).
199. See 1992 Worker Rights Review, supra note 198, at 4 (declaring that the
GSP subcommittee would extend review for six months to allow for completion of
the revised Labor Code).
200. See Chapultepec Accords, supra note 88, Ch. 5, § 8(A) (creating the Eco-
nomic and Social Forum, a tripartite body with equal representation of labor, business,
and government, with the objective of planning for the social and economic develop-
ment of the country). The Accords specifically state that "the Government will pro-
pose to the Forum the revision of the labor laws to promote and maintain a climate
of harmony in labor relations, without detriment to the unemployed or the general
public." Id.
201. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 51-53 (discussing the
government's failure to fulfill promises made to the Forum). These promises are not
new. In 1984, to gain access to Caribbean Basin Initiative benefits, the Salvadoran
government promised to take measures to protect the security of unions, clarify farm-
workers' right to organize, give unions access to EPZs, and impose sanctions on em-
ployers who harass or intimidate unions. Caribbean Basin Countries, supra note 154,
at 48-49.
202. See EL SALVADOR LABOR TRENDS, supra note 117, at 3-4 (noting that while
the Chapultepec Accords established the Forum in April, 1992, the Forum did not
begin functioning until September due to a boycott by the private sector).
203. See id. (observing that unions requested that the Forum discuss economic
adjustment policies before taking up labor law reform); INTERGRUMUAL DE
TRABAJADORES, PROPLESTA DE ANTEPROYECTO DE CODIGO DE TRABAJO [INTER-UNION
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private sector and the government on discussing the Labor Code first as
a delaying tactic, since neither of these sectors had presented any sub-
stantive proposals for Labor Code reform.2 '
The election of Bill Clinton in November 1992, led Salvadorans to
expect more rigorous enforcement of United States worker rights stan-
dards. 5 Seeing a political opening, the unions decided to drop their
immediate economic demands and push for substantive labor law reform,
using the threat of GSP suspension as leverage."° The government,
fearing that its failure to participate seriously in the Forum could jeopar-
dize its trade benefits, agreed to a process for negotiations,"° and the
unions presented a slate of demands that included both revision of the
labor code and other statutes, and ratification of key ILO conven-
tions." 8 As the February, 1993 deadline for the USTR's decision on El
Salvador's GSP benefits approached, political tensions increased. The
ARENA party and business leaders began a campaign of denunciation,
directed principally at the leadership of UNOC.2" ARENA deputies
introduced a bill to make expressions of support for suspension of El
Salvador's GSP privileges a crime of treason." °
OF WORKERS, PROPOSED LABOR CODE BILL] arts. 173-77 (1991) (El Sal.) (on file
with ILRERF) (proposing that El Salvador restructure the National Minimum Wage
Council and increase worker representation).
204. See EL SALVADOR LABOR TRENDS, supra note 117, at 3-4 (observing that
while the unions submitted a draft new Labor Code in August 1991, the government
did not present its proposals until December of 1992).
205. See ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 43 (describing the impact
of the United States presidential elections on the Forum).
206. See id. (summarizing the unions' negotiating strategy).
207. Situaci6n del Foro para ]a Concertaci6n Economica y Social a un Aflo de su
Instalaci6n, (1993) (on file with ILRERF) [hereinafter Situation of the Forum].
208. See generally id. (describing union demands).
209. See, e.g., La sucia "jugada" de la UNOC, EL DIARIO DE HOY, Jan. 28,
1993, at 6 (proclaiming that UNOC members are gangsters in the service of the
AFL-CIO); La petici6n laboral para ser excluidos del GSP, LA PRENSA GRAFICA,
Jan. 29, 1993, at 8 (reporting accusations that UNOC was attempting to sabotage the
Salvadoran economy); "Manoseo extranjero propicia UNOC": ISTA, EL MuNno, Feb.
5, 1993 (stating that the president of the Agrarian Institute called UNOC anti-
Salvadoran); Actitud de UNOC tiene que ser repudiada, dice Salguero Gross , EL
MUNDO, Feb. 8, 1993, at 6 (reporting that an ARENA deputy called UNOC "false
union leaders"); UNOC miente y actda antipatri6icamente, dice Pdte. de Conapes, LA
PRENSA GRAFICA, Feb. 13, 1993 (stating that president of Small Business Council ac-
cused UNOC of "antipatriotic attitudes").
210. See Piden Castigar Como "Traicidn a la Patria" Boicot de UNOC, DIARIO
DE Hoy, Jan. 29, 1993, at 5 (stating that the bill would label as a traitor anyone
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On February 17, 1993, the eve of the USTR's decision, the parties to
the Economic and Social Forum signed an Agreement of Principles!"
The unions dropped their demand for immediate economic measures; in
exchange, the government and private sector agreed to discuss ratifica-
tion of ILO conventions prior to negotiating reform of the Labor
Code."2 The unions muted their calls to cut off GSP benefits, and the
government ceased its verbal attacks on union leaders.2 3 For the first
time in El Salvador's history, government and business seemed prepared
to include labor as an equal partner.
B. CONSTrrUTIONAL GRIDLOCK
This unprecedented harmony soon soured as the government raised
constitutional objections to ratification of the principal JLO conventions
proposed by the unions.2 4 As the stalemate continued through April
who, by actions or declarations in the news media, defames the country with the
objective of damaging its reputation or interests, especially by preventing foreign
assistance).
211. Acuerdo de Principios y Compromisos Feb. 17, 1993 (El Sal.) [hereinafter
Agreement of Principles], reprinted in DIARIO DE Hoy, Feb. 20, 1993.
212. Id. The government and private sector pledged to relax requirements for legal
registration of unions, end discrimination on the basis of union affiliation, give union
leaders access to the workplace, and facilitate collective bargaining. Id. The parties
also agreed to propose, by April 30, 1993, ratification of "those ILO conventions
relating to union liberty and democracy, work of women and youth, employment and
minimum wage, to the extent not contradicting the Constitution." Id. They agreed to
complete the revision of the Labor Code by September 30, 1993. Id. Finally, the
Forum established a tripartite commission to seek solutions to pending labor conflicts.
Id.; see ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 46 (analyzing the Agreement
of Principles).
213. ILRERF Pre-Hearing Brief, supra note 105, at 46.
214. See Dictamen del Sector Gubemamental: Hearings Before the Forum for
Economic and Social Harmonization, Act 29-A, annex 2 (May 1993) (statement of Dr.
Rene Ivan Castro, Sub Comisi6n T~cnica Legal) (El Sal.) (asserting unconstitutionality
of six ILO conventions). The government contends that the following ILO conventions
are unconstitutional: ILO Convention 87, supra note 60; ILO Convention 98, supra
note 60; Convention Concerning Maternity Protection (Revised 1952) (Convention No.
103) (entered into force Sept, 7, 1955), reprinted in 1 ILO CoNvEmnoNs & RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 570; Convention Concerning Protection and Facilities
to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking (Convention No. 135)
(entered into force June 30, 1973), reprinted in 2 LO CONvENTIONS & RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, supra note 60, at 1005; Convention Concerning Protection of the Right to
Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public
Service (Convention No. 151) (entered into force Feb. 25, 1981), reprinted in 2 ILO
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CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 1178; and Convention Con-
cerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining (Convention No. 154) (entered into
force Aug. 1, 1981), reprinted in 2 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 60, at 1222. Government Position Statement, supra. The private sector considers
ILO Conventions 103 and 135 not unconstitutional but inconvenient. Opini6n del
Sector Empresarial; Hearings Before the Forum for Economic and Social Harmoniza-
tion, annex I (May 19, 1993) (statement of Dr. Francisco Bertrand Galindo, Comisi6n
T6cnica Legal [Expert Legal Comm'n]) (El Sal.) [hereinafter Private Sector Position
Statement].
The government offers three principal arguments to support its claim that the
ILO Conventions are unconstitutional. First, it asserts that Article 47 of the Constitu-
tion denies state and municipal employees the right to form unions. See
CONSTrruCION, art. 47 (El Sal.) (proclaiming that "[p]rivate sector employers and
workers . . . have the right to associate freely for the defense of their respective
interests, forming professional associations or unions."). Because state and municipal
employees are not specifically included in Article 47, they are excluded, and therefore
have no right to associate in unions. Thus Convention 87, which guarantees freedom
of association, contravenes the Constitution. Second, the government argues that the
right to form a union necessarily implies both the right to collective bargaining and
to strike. Article 219 of the Constitution regulates conditions of employment in the
civil service while Article 221 prohibits strikes by public and municipal workers.
CONSTrruCION, art. 221 (El Sal.). If ILO Conventions 98, 151, and 154 grant an
unrestricted right to strike to state employees, they are unconstitutional. Third, the
government claims that ILO Convention 87 violates the constitutional requirement that
union leaders be of Salvadoran nationality. CONSTrrUCION, art. 47 (El Sal.).
The government's position is untenable, for the following reasons. First, the
government's narrow reading of Article 47 creates an unnecessary conflict with El
Salvador's obligations as a member of the ILO. The ILO holds that because freedom
of association is a fundamental right, member states that have not ratified convention
87 are nevertheless bound by its principles under the ILO Constitution, and are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Freedom of Association. See Alice
O'Brien, Working Paper on ILO Convention No. 87, at 3 n. 10 (1993) (on file with
ILRERF) (citing ILO, First Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association, 32).
For example, although the United States has not ratified Convention No. 87, the
Committee on Freedom of Association has accepted eight complaints of violations of
freedom of association by the United States since 1982. O'Brien, supra, at 3 n.ll.
Moreover, because the freedom of association has become incorporated into customary
international law, it is binding on the Salvadoran government. See Leslie Deak, Cus-
tomary International Labor Laws and their Application in Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 14-26 (1994) (demonstrating that free-
dom of association is a part of customary international law). If Article 47 truly denies
freedom of association and organization to public employees, then El Salvador must
either modify its Constitution or withdraw from the ILO. But if it is possible to read
Article 47 as allowing state and municipal workers the right to associate and orga-
nize, then there is no inconsistency and no constitutional impediment to ratification.
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The Salvadoran government's present refusal to consider amending its consti-
tution to conform to ILO principles may be a political show, in view of its past
willingness to consider such amendments. See 1992 GSP Review Hearing, supra note
154, at 168 (testimony of the Hon. Miguel Angel Saaverria, Ambassador of El Salva-
dor) (suggesting that the government would consider altering the constitution to ex-
pand public employees' right to strike). Even if the government's objections are genu-
ine, a less narrow interpretation of Article 47 would allow it to coexist with the ILO
Conventions. According to this interpretation, (1) Article 47 does not prohibit, and
therefore permits, public employees to organize and bargain collectively, (2) the rights
of organization and collective bargaining do not include the right to strike in all
circumstances. See Argumentaci6n del Sector Laboral a Favor de Convenios de OIT
Sobre Libertades Sindicales: Hearings Before the Forum for Economic and Social
Harmonization, annex 3 (May 19, 1993) (statement of the Labor Sector, Subcomisi6n
T&cnica Legal) (El Sal.) [hereinafter Unions' Position Statement] (on file with
ILRERF) (advocating a broad reading of Article 47).
A broad reading of Article 47 is consistent with El Salvador's international
treaty obligations, other articles of the Constitution, and general principles of constitu-
tional construction. First, El Salvador is already bound by treaties that guarantee the
freedom of association. E.g., Acuerdo de San Jose Sobre Derechos Humanos, July 26,
1990, art. I, §5, reprinted in ACuERDOS, supra note 88, at 7, 9 (declaring that all
persons have the right of free association on trade union grounds and that the govern-
ment shall fully respect trade union liberty); Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
art. 20, § 4, G.A. Res. 217 A(m), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A1810 (1948) (establishing freedom of association); International Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 8, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) (addressing the right to join unions and strike in conformity with
local law); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
22, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (establishing freedom of
association consistent with national security and public safety). Since the Constitution
prohibits ratification of treaties that "restrict or in any way affect Constitutional dispo-
sitions," the freedom of association permitted by these treaties is presumably constitu-
tional. CONSTrruCION, art. 145 (El Sal.). Second, the Constitution itself contains a
clanse guaranteeing broad freedom of association. CONSTTuCION, art. 7 (El Sal.)
(stating that Salvadorans "have the right to associate freely and assemble peaceably
and without arms for any licit purpose"). Third, the leading authority on Salvadoran
constitutional jurisprudence holds that "constitutional dispositions should be interpreted
broadly when they favor the realization of [human rights], and narrowly when they
oppose [these rights]." Unions' Position Statement, supra, citing FRANCisCO
BERTRAND GALINDO, MANUAL OF CONSTrrnToINAL LAW 226.
Moreover, the ILO has never held that the freedom of association or the right
to organize and bargain collectively implies an absolute right to strike for all state
employees. Indeed, the Technical Commission of the Forum requested and received a
written opinion from the ILO to this effect. Letter from Dr. Arturo Bronstein, Chief,
ILO Labor Law Section, to Sandra Dunsmore, Secretary of the Forum for Economic
and Social Harmonization (Apr., 1993) [hereinafter Bronstein letter] (on file with
ILRERF); see ILO DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 114, I 365 (stating that freedom
of association in the case of public employees does not necessarily imply the right to
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
and May 1993, labor unrest increased." 5 The unions insisted that the
Forum discuss ILO Convention 87,"6 while the Government took the
position that even if the Forum should reach consensus on the "uncon-
stitutional" conventions, the president would refuse to recommend their
ratification by the Assembly.1 7 The result was gridlock. The unions
made another effort to salvage the negotiating process in July when they
proposed that a panel of ILO experts determine the constitutionality of
Conventions 87 and 98, and 'that the other disputed Conventions be
incorporated into secondary legislation." 8 In August 1993, the govern-
ment accepted the proposal for a labor code panel, with ILO advisors
assisting the technical drafting teams, but would not allow the ILO to
arbitrate the dispute over Conventions 87 and 98. The government did
agree to follow the recommendations of United Nations experts operat-
ing pursuant to the Truth Commission." 9
strike); cf 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7116(b)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (granting employees
of the United States Government the right to organization and collective bargaining,
but denying employees the right to strike).
In addition, ILO jurisprudence clearly establishes that laws regulating the na-
tionality of union leaders are not inconsistent with freedom of association. See
Unions' Position Statement, supra, at 14 (quoting ILO Manual of Freedom of Associ-
ation); ILO Recommendation Concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to
Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking (Recommendation No. 143), reprinted in
2 ILO CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 60, at 1005 (stating that
governments may regulate the types of workers' representatives entitled to protection).
215. See Situation of the Forum, supra note 207 (discussing unions' dissatisfaction
with the pace of negotiations in the Forum). On May 3, workers of the Ministry of
Public Works went on strike after the Minister reneged on a collective agreement that
the Minister and the employees had negotiated with the assistance of the Tripartite
Commission of the Forum, dealing another blow to the credibility of the negotiating
process. See Cr6nica del mes, 534-535 ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS 444, 460-61
(1993) (describing strikes by public works employees).
216. See PRocEso, May 26, 1993 (stating unions' position).
217. See Gobierno de la Repfiblica [Government of the Republic], Posici6n ante
los convenios de la Organizacidn Internacional del Trabajo, tratados durante el Foro
para la concertaci6n econ6mica y social [Position towards the ILO Conventions dis-
cussed in the forum for social and economic harmonization], 534-35 ESTUDIOS
CENTROAMERICANOS 497 (1993) (stating Government's position on the ILO conven-
tions that the Forum was discussing).
218. Acuerdo Complementario, draft proposal, Forum for Economic and Social
Harmonization, July 12, 1993 art. I, §§ 1-2 (El Sal.) (on file with ILRERF).
219. See Acuerdo Complementario, Draft Proposal, Forum for Economic and Social
Harmonization, art. I, §§ 1-2 (El Sal.) (on file with ILRERF) (stating that the gov-
ernment agreed to follow the recommendations of United Nations experts concerning
the constitutionality of ILO Conventions 87 and 98); cf. TRUTH COMMUSSION REPORT,
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As the November USTR hearing on El Salvador's GSP review ap-
proached, the Salvadoran government agreed to an ILO Direct Contacts
Mission. ° At the same time, a wave of public employee strikes para-
lyzed the government, which was able to restore order only by suspend-
ing the Constitution. Tm On October 22, 1993, an ILO expert, Dr.
Arturo Bronstein, participated in a crucial work session of the Labor
Code Commission of the Forum.' The parties agreed to a forty-nine
point program for reform of the Labor Code that Dr. Bronstein draft-
ed.
At the USTR hearing on November 3, 1993, the government testified
that it was prepared to transmit the ILO proposal, without amendment,
to the National Assembly by December 15, 1993."' In an unprecedent-
ed development, the ILO's Dr. Bronstein appeared as a government
supra note 104, at 254 (recommending that El Salvador ratify ILO Conventions 87
and 98, along with other fundamental human rights instruments).
220. ILO, 291st Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association, supra note 105
(reporting on the visit of Direct Contacts Mission to El Salvador from Sept. 27-Oct.
1, 1993). This was the first time since 1985 that the Salvadoran government had al-
lowed ILO observers into El Salvador, despite repeated requests. See, e.g. ILO, 288th
Report of the Comm. on Freedom of Association, supra note 105, 9M 9-10 (criticizing
the Salvadoran government's negative attitude toward 1LO inquiries). The ILO's report
noted the decline in incidents of physical violence against trade unionists, and ob-
served that industrial relations in El Salvador are "now moving decisively toward
normality." ILO, Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, supra note
105, I 239 (1993). The ILO qualified this conclusion by the assumption that there
would be prompt and effective labor law reform. See id., I 243 (noting widespread
anti-union discrimination reflecting weaknesses in the legal system).
221. See La aleccionadora huelga en el Ministerio de Salud, 539 ESTUtiOS CENT-
ROAMERiCANOS 890 (1993) (describing strikes by health care workers); Crdnica del
mnes, 539 EsTuDios CENTROAhmERCANOS 895, 902-04 (recounting strikes by public
employees); Agreement between Government of El Salvador and Public Sector Unions,
Sept. 25, 1993 (on file with ILRERF) (ending public sector strike); FENASTRAS Re-
port, supra note 131, at 7 (reporting that El Salvador's government used Decree 296,
a product of the revolutionary junta that briefly governed El Salvador following the
1979 coup, to break strikes by public employees).
222. USTR, Trade Pol'y Staff Comm., Generalized System of Preferences
Subcomm., GSP Annual Review Public Hearing, Nov. 3, 1993, at 60-68 (testimony of
Dr. Arturo Bronstein, Chief, ILO Labor Law Section) [hereinafter 1993 GSP Review
Hearing].
223. Propuesta de la OT para Reformar el Codigo de Trabajo de El Salvador
(1993) [hereinafter ILO Labor Code Reform Proposal], reprinted in LA REFORA DEL
CODIGO DE TRABAJO: POSICIONES 25 (1993).
224. 1993 GSP Review Hearing, supra note 222, at 54-57 (testimony of Dr. Juan
Sifontes, Minister of Labor of El Salvador).
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witness to explain the details of his proposal.' The Salvadoran unions
agreed that acceptance of the ILO proposal would fulfill the statutory
requirement of "taking steps," but urged USTR to set a November 30
deadline for terminating GSP benefits.'
Following the hearing, negotiations continued, with the business sector
continuing to object to two provisions of the ILO draft.27 On Decem-
ber 13, 1993, the Government introduced a bill in the National Assem-
bly to reform the Labor Code.' The Government's proposal diverged
from the consensus-building process of the Forum, unilaterally effecting
changes that the Forum had not discussed and that weakened the ILO
proposalY9 On December 17, 1993, USTR extended its review of El
Salvador pending the passage of legislation "consistent with the ILO
proposal."' " Following the ARENA party's electoral victory,"' the
National Assembly enacted the government's proposed Labor Code
amendments, which became law on May 12, 1994Y2 On July 1, 1994,
USTR terminated its review, in spite of the Salvadoran government's
failure to comply with its promises to USTR, the ILO, and Salvadoran
unions."
225. Id. at 60-72 (testimony of Dr. Arturo Bronstein).
226. Id. at 35 (statement of Amanda Villatoro, representative of UNOC); id. at 43
(statement of Miguel Ramirez, representative of FENASTRAS).
227. See Propuesta del Sector Empresarial, Nov. 15, 1993 (on file with ILRERF)
(stating private sector objections to ILO proposal).
228. Reformas al C6digo de Trabajo [Labor Code Reform Bill] arts. 1-52, Dec.
13, 1993 (El Sal.) [hereinafter Labor Code Reform Bill] (on file with ILRERF).
229. See Letter from ILRERF to USTR (Dec. 16, 1993) (stating objections to
reform bill). A number of the proposed changes took away rights that existed under
the 1972 Labor Code. Id. For example, the bill restricted the new category of unions
proposed by the ILO to extend bargaining rights to employees of small employers.
Labor Code Reform Bill, supra note 228, art. 15 (amending article 209 of the Labor
Code). It completely eliminated the provisions in the 1972 Labor Code that estab-
lished departmental union assemblies and executive boards for the 14 geographical de-
partments of El Salvador, leaving only national and enterprise-specific structures. Id.,
arts. 12-20 (amending articles 221-23). And it placed limits on the structure of union
executive committees that were not found in either the existing Labor Code or the
ILO proposal. Id., art. 24 (amending article 224).
230. USTR, Kantor Notes Progress in GSP Worker Rights Reviews; Continues
Four Reviews Until Actions Completed, Dec. 27, 1993, at 2.
231. See supra note 89, 9 and accompanying text (reporting the results of the
1994 elections).
232. Decreto Ley (D.L.) No. 859, Apr. 21, 1994 (El Sal.); Decreto orden (D.O.)
No. 87-BIS, Tomo No. 323, May 12, 1994 (El Sal.); see 1994 LABOR CODE, supra
note 107 (outlining the new Labor Code).




The Salvadoran experience suggests several ways in which Congress
could modify the worker rights provisions of the GSP statute to achieve
more effectively the purposes of the statute. Both worker rights advo-
cates and the Clinton administration have proposed changes to these
provisions.' If Congress decides to continue GSP in its present form,
it must address these proposed reforms prior to the expiration of the
GSP program's authorization on July 31, 1995."
Congress should strengthen the substantive worker rights criteria of
the GSP law. First, it should delete the "taking steps" language, at least
with respect to fundamental freedoms of association, organization, non-
discrimination, and non-coercion.' This language not only is
unenforceably vague,' 7 but also thwarts the intent of the statute by
permitting regimes that violate worker rights to avoid sanctions with
token reforms? 8 Linking non-fundamental labor standards, such as
wages, to a country's level of development is acceptable. But rights
essential to democratic participation, such as the freedom of association,
cannot be subordinated to the accumulation strategies of national
elites. 9 The GSP Renewal and Reform Act of 1993 requires "com-
plete compliance" with fundamental worker rights, but considers a
country's level of economic development in evaluating progress on wag-
es, hours, and child labor standards!' Second, the statute should ex-
the 1993 Annual GSP Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,970, 35,971 (1994) (terminating re-
view).
234. See GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6 (proposing amendments supported by
worker rights advocates); Administration Proposal on Renewal of the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) Program, Annex at 4-5, May 16. 1994 [hereinafter Ad-
ministration Proposal] (setting out the Clinton administration's proposed reforms); GSP
AsSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 118-120 (discussing proposed modifications to GSP
worker rights provisions).
235. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 4, § 601.
236. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (describing problems with the
"taking steps" language).
237. International Labor Rights II, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
238. See, e.g., supra notes 201, 212, and 233 and accompanying text (discussing
unfulfilled promises by the government of El Salvador to respect worker rights).
239. See Robert B. Reich, Keynote Address, in INTERNATiONAL LABOR STAN-
DARDS & GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSnJM 1, 4
(Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1994) (suggesting that where a
country lacks democratic institutions, low labor standards probably reflect the econom-
ic interests of elites rather than legitimate constraints on the country's economy).
240. GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, at § 3(d)(4) (distinguishing the compliance
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plicitly incorporate the jurisprudence of the International Labor Orga-
nization in defining the scope of each worker right.24' Along with the
removal of "taking steps," explicit reference to ILO jurisprudence in the
GSP Renewal and Reform Act of 1993 should put to rest the unhappy
distinction between worker rights and human rights that served to ratio-
nalize USTR's inaction on El Salvador during the Reagan and Bush
administrations.242
The GSP statute needs a major procedural overhaul as well. First,
USTR should be required to accept any non-frivolous complaint. The
administration's reform proposal would require USTR to accept any peti-
tion containing allegations that are "factually correct and of a serious
nature" with respect to any enumerated worker rights criterion.24 The
GSP Reform Bill would allow USTR to reject a worker rights petition
only upon a showing that the petition is frivolous.2" These provisions
would limit USTR's discretion to accept or reject a petition, which has
been employed to serve foreign policies unrelated to worker rights.245
Second, Congress should eradicate USTR's "no new information"
standard.2' This criterion has no basis in the statute.24 Moreover, the
standard is illogical: because "the concept of making progress to meet
international standards is at the heart of GSP country practice provi-
standard for fundamental worker rights, such as freedom of association, from the stan-
dard for wages, hours, and child labor). The GSP Reform Bill also adds a prohibition
on race, sex, and religious discrimination to the list of fundamental worker rights. Id.
241. See id. at §3(d)(4)(i) (providing that in determining compliance with the stat-
ute, USTR shall apply recognized international standards, including ILO Conventions).
See GSP ASSESMENT, supra note 29, at 107-11 (observing that despite Congress's
intention, USTR has not relied upon ILO jurisprudence for interpreting GSP worker
rights provisions).
242. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (describing USTR's efforts to dis-
tinguish worker rights from human rights).
243. Administration Proposal, supra note 234, Annex at 4.
244. GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, at § 5(c)(1)(C).
245. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (describing rejection of El
Salvador worker rights petitions).
246. See GSP AssEssMENT, supra note 29, at 123 (recommending that USTR
clarify the new information standard to indicate that a beneficiary country's failure to
comply with promises that formed the basis of a decision to deny a petition would in
itself constitute substantial new information); GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, at §
5(c)(1)(C) (stating that the determination whether to accept a petition shall be made
without regard to allegations in previously reviewed petitions); Administration Propos-
al, supra note 234, Annex at 4-5 (retaining the existing new information standard).
247. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that USTR's new informa-
tion regulation has no basis in the statute).
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sions." 4 It is contradictory to reject petitions on the grounds that the
worker rights situation in the beneficiary country is not getting
worse.
249
Third, there should be a time limit for reviewstm USTR should not
have the discretion to keep a beneficiary developing country under in-
definite review, without imposing sanctions." While this procedure
may provide both the United States and unions in the beneficiary coun-
try with political leverage, it runs the risk of undercutting the credi-
bility of the statute when reviews are continued in exchange for mere
promises.
Fourth, to balance the requirement that reviews be of finite duration,
petitioners and USTR should have the option of targeting particular
products from industries that violate worker rights.m Partial sanctions
would give worker rights advocates greater strategic flexibility, allowing
pressure to be applied on a beneficiary country without requiring a
complete revocation of its GSP benefits.'
Fifth, the annual petition cycle should be made more flexible to ac-
commodate rapidly changing events in beneficiary countriestm The ad-
ministration has proposed a two-stage review process which lengthens
the review cycle. 6 Under this proposal, USTR would conduct a two-
248. GSP ASSESShmNT, supra note 29, at 125.
249. See id. at 122 (stating that the new information standard has prevented re-
view of worker rights cases where a beneficiary country stops making progress once
its GSP review terminates).
250. See GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, at § 5(c)(1)(F) (requiring a decision on
a petition within 270 days).
251. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (noting continued review of
El Salvador petitions).
252. See DORMAN, supra note 29, at 6 (suggesting that probationary status is nec-
essary to give United States policy-makers flexibility in implementing worker rights
standards).
253. See GSP ASSEShmENT, supra note 29, at 123 (recommending that USTR in-
clude partial sanctions as an option); DORIAN, supra note 29, at 6 (recommending
procedures for worker rights petitions targeting specific sectors).
254. See GSP ASSESSmENT, supra note 29, at 123 (arguing that partial sanctions
would produce both flexibility and equity).
255. See id at 123 (recommending that USTR review country practice petitions on
a separate time schedule from product petitions and that it accept emergency petitions
for review out of cycle).
256. Administration Proposal, supra note 234, Annex at 5. The principal rationales
for the two-stage process are to clarify facts prior to acceptance of a petition, to
afford due process to beneficiary countries, and to make the formal review process
more effective. Id.
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to-three month preliminary review, during which it would seek com-
ments from the beneficiary country and conduct an interagency investi-
gation. 7 If the petition were accepted for "full formal review," USTR
would hold hearings and issue a decision within one year of the filing
of the petition. 8 The administration's proposal does not state what
criteria would be used to distinguish a full formal review from a pre-
liminary review. 9 On balance, this proposal should be rejected be-
cause it increases the duration and reduces the flexibility of the review
process, and because it gives USTR the kind of discretion to reject peti-
tions that has been susceptible to political pressure."
Finally, the statute must ensure that USTR's decisions are subject to
judicial review.26" ' Congress should clarify the jurisdiction of the feder-
al courts over actions by USTR. 62 And the law should define the in-
terests of petitioners so as to address potential objections that they lack
standing to seek review.263
Looking beyond the current GSP framework, Congress should consid-
er replacing the current punitive system for worker rights enforcement
with an incentive system. This is the approach being developed in the
European Community (EC), which is also in the midst of reforming its
GSP provisions.' The EC is currently discussing a proposal, support-
ed by European trade unions, to offer discounts of twenty to thirty
257. Id.
258. Id. The Administration Proposal states that the GSP Subcommittee would use
these hearings "not merely for information collection but to advance its objectives."
Id.
259. See GSP AssmsSMENT, supra note 29, at 123 (recommending that USTR
make public the guidelines it uses to decide whether or not to accept worker rights
petitions for full review).
260. See supra notes 38 and 65 and accompanying text (discussing politicization
of the GSP review process).
261. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing denial of judicial
review of USTR decisions).
262. See GSP Reform Bill, supra note 6, at § 5(c)(4) (providing for review of
USTR decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
263. See id., § 3(d)(5) (defining persons eligible to file worker rights petitions);
Collingsworth, Worker Rights Enforcement, supra note 25, at 27-35 (discussing means
of providing standing for petitioners).
264. See Report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation, Eur. Parl.
Doc. (PE DOC A4-38/94) 4-5 (1994) (proposing a resolution to the European Par-
liament emphasizing GSP's role as a development instrument and proposing social




percent below the most-favored nation (MFN) tariff rate for developing
countries that conform to social (including worker rights) and environ-
mental clauses.' For example, tariffs would be reduced for a country
that certifies that it allows workers to join unions and negotiate collec-
tively. Conversely, GSP benefits could be suspended under a narrow
set of circumstances.'
CONCLUSION
El Salvador's experience with GSP teaches several lessons about the
utility of applying worker rights criteria to United States trade programs.
First, the GSP petitions had an effect on worker rights in El Salvador.
The threat to withdraw GSP benefits created a limited political opening
for Salvadoran unions.' The GSP issue focused and stimulated the
tripartite negotiations in the Forum, where government and private sec-
tor, for the first time in El Salvador's history, had to sit across the table
with workers and negotiate the future of Salvadoran industrial relations.
As a result of this process, labor emerged as a significant political force.
In addition, El Salvador for the first time recognized to some degree the
jurisdiction of the ILO.'
The second lesson is that the effect of the worker rights petitions was
not very great. The Forum did not ratify the fundamental ILO conven-
tions. While El Salvador enacted a new labor code in 1994, its provi-
sions are substantially weaker than the unions' original proposals. More
importantly, on the shop floor and the hacienda, employers continue to
act with impunity. Given El Salvador's history of worker rights viola-
tions, even serious and substantial legal reforms can have little effect
until the government makes a serious commitment to enforce existing
laws.
265. Letter from Michael Hindley, Member of the European Parliament, to the au-
thor (Jan. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
266. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at D45 (1994).
267. Report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation, supra note 264
(proposing that GSP benefits be suspended only in cases such as fraud, slavery, pris-
on labor, and denial of equal treatment to men and women).
268. See supra notes 205-08, 220-23 and accompanying text (recounting the po-
litical opportunities that the GSP review process created for Salvadoran unions).
269. See supra notes 220-26 (discussing the ILO's role in negotiating labor law
reform).
270. See supra notes 103-72 and accompanying text (describing the history of vio-
lations of worker rights in El Salvador).
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The ineffectiveness of the GSP worker rights provisions was due in
part to the debility of the statute itself."' Political factors were a more
important determinant. The Reagan and Bush administrations, no friends
of either United States or Salvadoran unions, displayed little enthusiasm
for enforcing the worker rights laws.' Were it not for El Salvador's
hyperdependency on the United States, the limited economic threat
posed by the GSP worker rights review might have had no political
consequences at all. 3 And while Salvadoran unions took substantial
risks to support the cutoff of GSP benefits,274 ideological divisions
hampered the effectiveness of labor's efforts in both El Salvador and the
United States.
75
Perhaps the final lesson of El Salvador's experience with GSP is that
sovereignty is a useless abstraction for workers who face economic
coercion and state terror at the hands of a national elite. Worker rights
advocates argue that solidarity must now replace sovereignty if workers'
fundamental freedoms are to be preserved." The battle over worker
rights in El Salvador is one small part of the struggle to achieve that
solidarity.
271. See supra notes 236-63 and accompanying text (describing deficiencies in the
worker rights provisions of the GSP statute).
272. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal of the
Reagan and Bush administrations to accept GSP petitions on El Salvador); supra note
233 and accompanying text (noting the termination of El Salvador's worker rights
review, even though the Salvadoran government reneged on its promises to the ILO
and Salvadoran unions).
273. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (describing El Salvador's eco-
nomic and political dependence on the United States).
274. See supra notes 209-10 (describing attacks on Salvadoran unionists who
called for suspension of El Salvador's GSP benefits).
275. See supra notes 186-93 (discussing political divisions in the United States and
Salvadoran labor movements).
276. See Compa, International Labor Rights, supra note 64, at 149 (proposing
legal strategies for workers in a global economy); Garver, supra note 49, at 71 (ar-
guing for labor solidarity to protect international worker rights).
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